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Why do macro wage elasticities diverge? 
A meta analysis 
 
This study analyses macro wage elasticities on labour productivity, payroll taxes, average and 
marginal income tax, consumer and producer prices, the replacement ratio and the 
unemployment rate. The data have been analyzed in a meta analysis that relates differences in 
each elasticity of pay to variations in study characteristics, economic or institutional variables 
and the econometric specification of underlying wage equations. The results indicate that 
notably the econometric specification of the reported wage equation matters. The dynamic 
specification, the choice of explanatory variables and restrictions on estimated coefficients all 
have their impact on estimated elasticities. The reported value of the output price elasticity of 
pay is sensitive to restrictions on the consumer price and vice versa. In case of tax elasticities 
the dynamic specification matters, and the value of the replacement ratio elasticity of pay based 
on sectoral data is higher than the one obtained from macro data. The results for the 
unemployment elasticity of pay are close to those found in the wage curve literature. Finally, 
we generate benchmark values for each type of elasticity. 
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1  Wages through the ages 
1.1  Scope of the study 
Wages and wage formation have always been central items in economics. In addition many 
empirical studies have investigated the practical impact of wages on economic performance. 
Roughly spoken, there are three lines of approach. The first is the relation between wages, 
production and prices. This research was partly triggered by high inflation rates in the 1960s 
and 1970s of the 20th century (see e.g. Nickell (1987)). The second line focuses on wages and 
unemployment, initiated in 1958 by A.W. Phillips in his classic review on the relation between 
the rate of change of nominal wages and unemployment. Although his approach has been 
questioned (see e.g. Phelps (1968), Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)), high or persistent 
unemployment has triggered a lot of  research to closely examine wage formation (Drèze and 
Bean (1990)). A third line is linked to economic policy reforms (Sørensen (1997)). The use of 
large computer models to examine the impact of policy reforms on the performance of the 
labour market requires a sound theoretical and empirical underpinning of the role of wages (see 
e.g. Graafland et al. (2001)).  
A lot of these studies formulate and estimate wage equations. These describe the impact of 
institutional and economic factors like taxes, replacement rates, union behaviour, search costs, 
prices, productivity and unemployment on wage formation. Empirical information is mainly 
summarized through estimated wage elasticities. This is of major practical importance, as 
irrespective the theoretical model, it is virtually always possible to derive and compute wage 
elasticities and compare the results with findings of others. This is the principal aim of this 
study. We have gathered and computed about 1000 elasticities of pay from some hundred 
articles, books and working papers. We are not solely interested in mean or median values, but 
possible differences are also examined: are all estimates of a particular elasticity close to each 
other? If not, is this due to cross country differences, time dependency, theoretical specification, 
number of data points, estimation techniques or other factors? And finally, can we derive a ‘best 
guess’ of wage elasticities for a particular country on the basis of the collected results?    
1.2  Other meta studies on elasticities of pay 
Nijkamp and Poot (2005) and Clar et al. (2007) perform a meta analysis on the unemployment 
elasticity of pay. Both studies are clearly inspired by the pathbreaking work of Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1995) on the wage curve. The wage curve describes the responsiveness of 
individual real wages to changing local market conditions; essentially it is a short run business 
cycle phenomenon (Nijkamp and Poot (2005), Card (1995)). An inverse relationship between 
wages and local unemployment rates has been found. The average unemployment elasticity of  
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pay amounts to about -0.10.  As Card (1995) argues: the tendency for the wage curve to show 
up for different kinds of workers, in different economies and at different times suggests that the 
wage curve may be close to an ‘empirical law of economics’. Wage curve elasticities vary, 
however, between different groups of workers, for different time periods and at different 
locations.  
As outlined in the previous section, our scope is different. We are mainly interested in long 
run macro elasticities that can be used to calibrate policy simulation models. A second 
difference is that we focus on eight elasticities rather than just the unemployment elasticity (see 
section 2.2 and section 3). Yet it may be interesting to compare our results to those reported in 
the three studies above. Does the ‘empirical law of economics’ also hold in case of long run 
macro unemployment elasticities of pay? Are observed values of ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ 
elasticities ‘close’ to each other? In sections 4.4. and 6.9 we will see that the empirical 
similarity is remarkable.   
1.3  Outline of the study 
Section 2 describes the global approach, based on a number of guidelines proposed by Stanley 
(2001). In section 3, I first describe very briefly the various theories behind wage equations, and 
then we examine how an ideal empirical wage equation would look like and how it can be 
rewritten using tax and price wedges rather than separate tax and price variables. Finally, an 
example illustrates the derivation of elasticities from estimated coefficients. Section 4 is 
devoted to the construction of the meta sample. The selection and construction of regressors 
that may explain the variation in a specific elasticity is discussed in section 5, and results show 
up in section 6. This chapter also applies the results of the analysis to compute ‘best’ values for 
each type of elasticity. Concluding remarks follow in section 7.   
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2  Five steps to a meta analysis 
Meta analysis has become an important tool in evaluating the current flood of conflicting 
scientific evidence (see e.g. Rothstein et al. (2005)). “Meta analysis moves literature reviews 
away from casual judgements about ‘good’ studies that deserve attention and ‘bad’ studies that 
should be set aside. Instead it provides a replicable statistical framework for summarizing and 
interpreting the full range of evidence.” (Stanley (2001)). The dependent variable is a summary 
statistic, like a wage elasticity, drawn from each study, while independent variables may include 
characteristics of the method, design and data used in these studies. It is often argued that a 
meta analysis will produce an estimate that has broader generalizability than any single study. 
In addition, such an assessment may even provide further insight (Sutton et al. (2001)). Stanley 
(2001) suggests five steps to successfully conduct a meta analysis: 
 
2.1  Step 1: Include all relevant studies from a standard database  
A computer search of standard data bases is clearly the place to start. Include all studies, 
published or not, to reduce potential biases introduced by any non-random selection. The use of 
a standard search engine is straightforward, but it requires some creativity in selecting the 
keywords: ‘wage equation’, ‘wage elasticities’, ‘elasticities of pay’, ‘empirical wage equation’ 
all yield different results. As the main topic of many articles of interest is not a wage equation 
as such, but rather inflation or unemployment or NAIRU estimates, I have also put some effort 
in those directions. In a second stage, I explored all references in the collected articles. Our 
meta sample contains 155 studies, of which 108 have been used. More details can be found in 
section 4. 
 
2.2  Step 2: choose a summary statistic and reduce the evidence to a 
common metric 
Our relevant statistic is a wage elasticity or equivalently an elasticity of pay. First we have to 
decide what elasticities of pay we are interested in. We have selected eight elasticities, related 
to labour productivity, the average income tax rate, the marginal income tax rate, payroll tax, 
producer price, consumer price, the net replacement rate and the unemployment rate. Direct 
estimation of these elasticities requires a log linear specification, which is not common in the 
primary literature. Section 3 deals with the problem of constructing a ‘common’ metric. Are 
elasticities obtained from various specifications comparable?  
Another problem is the wide variety in wage definitions. From section 4.1 it follows that 
there are at least 15 definitions, ranging from ‘gross yearly wage per employee’ to ‘ratio of real  
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consumer wage to real post tax benefits’. Section 4.1. elaborates upon this problem and selects 
an appropriate wage definition (gross yearly wage per employee). 
For each study in our sample, I registered two general characteristics: publication year and 
publication medium (journal, working paper, unpublished). Then, for each separate wage 
equation, I selected 12 additional characteristics: 
(i)  country 
(ii)  aggregate or sectoral estimate 
(ii)  data type (time series, cross section, panel) 
(iii)  data frequency 
(iv)  begin and end year of the sample 
(v)  wage definition 
(vi)  transformation of dependent variable (log’s, relative change, level, first difference) 
(vii)  for each wage equation 7 indicators that show whether the other relevant elasticities are 
included or can be computed;  
(viii)  16 dummies that indicate possible restrictions on estimated coefficients in the reported 
equations (see section 5.2)  
(ix)  14 indicators on other possible explanatory variables included (like employment, union 
density, minimum wage, output gap, profit per employee) 
(x)  total number of regressors 
(xi)  dynamic specification indicators (all variables in levels, or all in first differences or 
some Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL, including error correction mechanisms)) 
(xii)  estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or a system estimator? 
 
This information was used to construct moderator variables (see section 2.3 below).  
 
2.3  Step 3: choose moderator variables 
The moderator variables are the control variables in the meta equation. Two models are 
frequently used: fixed and random effects models (Sutton et al. (2001)). These methods differ 
from the common definitions of fixed and random effects models in panel data analysis (e.g. 
Florax (2002)). The fixed effects model in meta analysis estimates a single common effect 
applying a Generalized Least Squares method using the inverse of standard errors as weight. As 
most of the elasticities in the meta sample have been obtained from estimated coefficients, 
standard errors are generally not available. Therefore I used dummy variables to capture 
heterogeneity. These variables are linked to main characteristics of studies, not to details. The 
selection of dummies is outlined in section 5.  
An additional problem concerns the distinction between within-study and between-study 
variation in wage elasticities. It is common in empirical economics for one study to generate  
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more than one estimate of the parameter of interest. Some authors report just the final equation 
while other publish a number of intermediate results. Selection of one parameter value per study 
may be misleading and inefficient as additional variation is ignored (Florax (2002)). As is well 
known, including more than 1 value per study introduces interdependency across the meta 
sample: some group of elasticities may be correlated with another group as they have been 
estimated on the same sample and using the same theoretical specification.  
In our case there may be an additional correlation as various types of elasticities (e.g. payroll 
and income taxes) have been obtained from the same study. So the meta sample of payroll tax 
elasticities may be correlated with the observations on income tax elasticities.  
To keep the analysis tractable, if all specifications within a specific study are estimated 
using the same data set, then I take just one of them. In most cases I prefer the results that the 
authors regard as ‘best’ (see also Stanley (2001)); in some cases there is an alternative that 
better meets the goal of the analysis and that cannot be statistically rejected. The possible 
correlation between different types of elasticities obtained from the same wage equation is 
accounted for, however. We will discuss this topic in section 5.2. 
2.4  Step 4: conduct a meta-regression analysis 
This is the topic of sections 5 and 6. Section 5.4 specifies the equation to be estimated in its 
most general form. I prefer the method of Least Absolute Deviations (LAD, see Rousseeuw and 
Leroy (1987)). LAD estimation produces more robust estimates than Least Squares methods as 
it is less sensible to outliers in the dependent variable. The total number of meta regressions is 
eight: one for each type of wage elasticity. 
2.5  Step 5: Subject the analysis to specification testing 
The common method is to estimate all meta equations including as many dummies as possible.  
The results of the analysis have been used to compute benchmark values for all types of 
elasticities. I distinguish four country groups, two levels of aggregation and short and long term 
elasticities. Sensitivity analysis is performed in four ways. 
First, benchmark values have been calculated using alternative settings of moderator 
variables. Do tax elasticities change if we impose that the sum of both price elasticities equals 
one? Second, statistical tests have been applied to each meta equation to test the joint null 
hypotheses that some of the moderator variables can be omitted. Benchmark elasticities have 
also been computed on basis of these restricted LAD estimates. Third, I estimated the equations 
using Ordinary Least Squares and again computed benchmark elasticities. Finally, a system 
estimation method was applied to a common sub-sample of  some wage elasticities and 
corresponding benchmark variables were computed.   
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In addition, I also investigate whether the unemployment elasticity of wages depends on the 
related level of the replacement rate (Graafland and Huizinga (2001)). A similar test is 
performed for the possible relation between the replacement rate elasticity and the average level 
of the unemployment rate.    
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3  Wage equations and elasticities 
This chapters starts with a brief overview of common theoretical underpinnings and derivations 
of empirical wage equations in 3.2. Section 3.3 formulates a general wage equation and 
introduces some suitable assumptions to derive the desired long run elasticities. Section 3.4 
reformulates the equation in case taxes and prices enter the wage equation through wedge 
variables. Finally section 3.4. gives some examples of transformations needed if elasticities 
cannot directly be derived from estimated coefficients. 
3.1  Wage formation in a nutshell 
In the standard wage bargaining theory wages result from negotiations between employers’ and 
employees’ organizations (see e.g. Layard et al. (1991)). Indeed, in the absence of unions, the 
neoclassical theory predicts that wages are determined by market clearing conditions only. At 
the other extreme, government measures may fully prescribe wage developments. In practice, 
usually both employers and unions have an impact on wage setting. 
Efficiency in wage bargaining requires that all elements that affect the utility of the agents 
are subject of the wage bargain (Manning (1987)). As the wage resulting from the bargain has a 
decisive impact on the employment perspectives of the employees, an efficient bargain will 
include a contract on wages as well as on employment. The wage-employment solutions lie on 
the bargaining contract curve, which is defined as the locus of points of tangency between the 
firm’s isoprofit curve and the union’s indifference curve. This approach is known as the 
‘efficient bargaining model’ or the ‘contract curve model’.  
An alternative model is the so-called ‘right-to-manage’ model. Here unions and employers 
organizations negotiate on wages only, whereas individual firms have the right to choose 
employment at desired levels. The outcome of this bargain is clearly not Pareto efficient, but in 
practice employers organisations may prefer to negotiate on wages only: individual employers 
should be able to adjust employment to shifts in demand.  
In practical applications two possible strategies can be distinguished. A number of authors 
(e.g. Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988), Brunello and Sonedda (2006), Dolado and Bentolila 
(1993)) starts with a careful theoretical description of the labour market and the bargaining 
process and derives relations for wages, prices and (un)employment. These relations serve as a 
starting point for estimation and testing. This is a fruitful approach in developing a policy 
evaluation model or if one wants to add specific elements in the bargaining process that are not 
standard. A second line is to apply a common wage equation from the literature, like the one 
derived by Layard et al. (1991), (see Dolado et al. (1986)), Lauer (1999), Nunziata (2005)).  
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Finally, a number of papers directly specifies a wage equation, inspired by a wage bargaining 
process but not formally derived from it. This is a common way if one ‘needs’ a wage equation 
to analyze e.g. wage stickiness, unemployment or inflation. Examples are Carruth and Schnabel 
(1993), Fritsche et al. (2005), Guichard and Laffargue (2000) and Pehkonen (1999). 
From these models a number of important wage determinants can be selected. First, labour 
productivity, which is a decisive factor for long-run real wages. Second, output and consumer 
prices, to deflate wages or wage costs, while the gap or wedge between both prices is a measure 
of consumer taxes and prices of final imports. Third, the wedge between the wage bill paid by 
the employer (wage cost) and the take home wage of the employee; this implies that both 
payroll taxes paid by the producer and income taxes affect wage setting. Another key variable is 
the fallback position of employees in case they lose their jobs, usually measured through the 
replacement ratio (e.g. Pissarides (2000)). And finally, the unemployment rate, either inspired 
by the traditional Phillips curve approach or by the existence of a wage curve.  
From this discussion we select the elasticities reported in Table 3.1 below, similar to the 
classifications applied by Graafland and Huizinga (1994) and Tyrvainen (1995a). 
Table 3.1  Selected elasticities of gross wages 
Elasticity  Corresponding variable  Range 
     
Labour productivity  q  0 ≤ εq ≤ 1 
Payroll taxes  1+s  − 1 ≤ ε1+s ≤ 0 
Average income retention rate  1−ta  ε1-a ≤ 0 
Marginal income retention rate  1−tm  ε1-m ≥ 0 
Consumer price  pc  εc ≥ 0 
Output price  py  εy ≥ 0 
Replacement ratio  ρ  ερ ≥ 0 
Unemployment rate  u  εu ≤ 0 
 
Labour productivity q is defined as the average yearly production per employee (see also the 
discussion in section 4.1). The replacement ratio ρ is defined as the net income if unemployed 
over the net wage when employed; pc and py are consumer and output prices.  
The next section discusses some practical issues about the use of elasticities from a given 
wage equation.  
3.2  Comparing elasticities from different wage equations 
A reported wage equation is frequently not log linear in its arguments and hence estimated 
coefficients are not equal to elasticities. The equation may also have a complex dynamic 
structure and parameter restrictions may have been imposed during estimation. In addition, in 
section 4 we will see that there exists a wide variety in definitions of the relevant wage variable.  
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Indeed, irrespective of the variability of definitions, wage elasticities can almost always be 
computed, but do they still meet the requirement of a ‘common metric’? Are we comparing 
apples and oranges?  
It is obvious that using elasticities obtained from all types of equations and dynamic 
specifications introduces an additional source of heterogeneity. Even if we transform all 
elasticities to a common wage definition, for example gross yearly wages per employee, then it 
probably still matters how they have been measured in the estimated equation.  
I use two possible methods to cope with this problem. First through the inclusion of 
appropriate moderator variables in the meta equations. These dummies capture variation in 
elasticities due to the definition of the wage variable: hourly wages or yearly wages, real or 
nominal wages, gross wages or net of income taxes? Second, I use the results of the analyses to 
compute benchmark values for all elasticities of interest (see section 6). Then I investigate the 
sensitivity of these values to changes in wage definitions, and to possible restrictions imposed 
during estimation (e.g. through inclusion of a tax wedge rather than separate payroll and income 
tax variables).  
3.3  Towards a common wage definition 
Empirical wage definitions are anything but uniform: we observe wages, wage costs, yearly and 
hourly wages, gross and net wages, real and nominal wages; what is the most suitable 
definition?  
The sample consists of 92 publications. All studies contain one or more wage equations, but 
there is not much uniformity in the definition of the dependent variable. Table 3.2 summarizes 
all actual concepts. 
The number of definitions is even larger than the table indicates as the indication ‘real’ may 
refer to deflation by consumer prices, output prices or the GDP price deflator. From a 
theoretical point of view, a suitable definition of wage is the hourly wage rate per worker. This 
fits to the definition of labour productivity as the hourly production per employee. This wage 
definition is related to 53 reported equations only. Therefore I preferred a more practical 
definition: the gross yearly wage per employee. Conversion of hourly wages to yearly wages 
requires the number of hours worked (which may change from year to year) as well as extra 
allowances (for overtime work or holidays, for example).  
Technical details are summarized in Appendix A. It discusses the computation of elasticities 
from generally specified wage equations.   
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Table 3.2  Wage definitions 
Definition  Number of cases 
   
Gross wage per employee  91 
Gross wage costs per employee  27 
Real gross wage per employee  21 
Real gross wage costs per employee  46 
Net wage per employee  37 
Gross hourly wage  1 
Gross hourly wage costs  1 
Real gross hourly wage costs  8 
Real net hourly wage  43 
Real consumer wage  10 
Ratio of real consumer wage and real post tax benefits  2 
Nominal monthly wages  1 
Real monthly wages  7 
Quarterly gross wages per employee  1 
Nominal unit Labour costs  6 
   
Total  296 
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4  Construction of the meta samples 
4.1  Introduction 
In section 4.2 we discuss the selection of useful papers. The remaining sections describe the 
meta sample: 4.3 highlights the representation of various countries and country groups and 
finally section 4.4 summarizes the data by type of elasticity. 
4.2  Selection of relevant papers  
The base collection contains 116 publications. The list is not exhaustive but it covers time 
series, cross section and panel data studies on countries and firms, published either in books, 
official journals or as working or conference paper. They have been collected by scanning 
electronic data bases of journals and publications of research institutes and conferences. First, I 
have used Google Scholar to search on ‘wage equations’, and ‘wage elasticities’. Soon it 
became clear that many wage equations were estimated to study unemployment, inflation or the 
impact of tax measures. So I also tried al possible combinations of these items. In a second 
round also relevant cited papers were examined. In the end 92 papers proved to be useful for 
our purpose. What is ‘useful’? 
The main scope is the collection of elasticities of the macro wage equation, rather than those 
of the individual earnings equation. Here the qualification ‘macro’ does not necessarily refer to 
average wage per worker in the whole economy; it may also be the outcome of a (decentralized) 
bargaining process between employers and unions in a specific production sector. Individual 
earnings equations on the other hand link the wage of a specific person to his or her level of 
education, working experience, age, marital status, union membership, and other variables. 
Although these earnings may also very well be influenced by regional or national demand 
factors (among which the unemployment rate is by far the most popular) their pattern is hardly 
even explained by payroll or income taxes, welfare benefits or output prices. Individual 
earnings equations are very useful in estimating wage curves (see also section 1). I decided not 
to use the unemployment elasticities of pay from these equations in order to examine possible 
differences between ‘individual’ and ‘macro’ elasticities.  
Another selection criterion is the computational effort needed to extract the desired 
elasticities. In a number of cases they could not be computed from data provided by the authors 
as very specific additional data were needed. For example: time series of regional or sectoral 
unemployment rates, average opportunity wage outside the manufacturing industry or average 
income tax rates for specific groups.  
  16 
What about short and long term elasticities? If both are reported, I have used the long term 
values. Some authors however express the wage variable in first differences, differences in the 
log of wages or percentage changes. The related elasticities can be interpreted as short run 
values. These elasticities are also included in the meta regressions.  
4.3  Construction and completeness 
Once the publications were selected, I generated data vectors for each type of wage elasticity by 
stacking observations in alphabetical order. So the first element in each vector refers to the first 
wage equation in the first study. This method has the strong advantage that the i-th value of all 
elasticity vectors refers to a common equation. If  a publication yields less than 8 elasticities, 
missing values are included as Not Available (NA). Consequently all vectors of elasticities have 
equal length. 
Figure 4.1 classifies the estimated wage equations by the number of included elasticities in 
demand. It appears that almost 25% of all equations include at most 2 of the desired elasticities. 
Of course this does not imply that the equation at hand only contains two regressors, but 
nevertheless possible interactions between the various elasticities may not be fully taken into 
account.   





























4.4  Sample characteristics 
Table 4.1 illustrates the distribution of estimated elasticities by type and over countries.    
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Table 4.1  Number of computed elasticities by type and country 
Country  q ε   s + 1 ε   a − 1 ε   m − 1 ε   c ε   y ε   ρ ε   u ε   total 
                   
Australia  2  2  2  1  5  2  1  4  19 
Austria  5  1  1  0  2  3  0  6  18 
Belgium  4  1  2  0  3  2  0  5  17 
Bulgaria  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  2 
Canada  4  2  3  1  3  3  1  7  24 
Denmark  6  4  1  1  2  5  5  10  34 
Finland  8  21  19  1  18  23  10  13  113 
France  10  5  6  1  9  9  2  14  56 
Germany  14  6  5  1  7  12  2  17  64 
Hungary  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  2 
Ireland  3  2  2  1  1  2  1  4  16 
Italy  8  5  6  1  4  7  0  12  43 
Japan  5  3  2  1  3  3  0  5  22 
The Netherlands  39  32  36  1  29  32  27  39  235 
New Zealand  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  2  5 
Norway  5  7  5  0  5  9  5  14  50 
Poland  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  3  4 
Portugal  2  0  0  0  1  1  0  2  6 
Romania  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  2 
Spain  6  5  4  1  5  6  6  10  43 
Sweden  7  8  9  2  7  11  2  14  60 
Switzerland  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  2  3 
UK  10  11  12  2  7  13  8  20  83 
USA  7  6  5  1  6  8  2  12  47 
Country groups   4  6  10  2  6  1  2  5  36 
                   
Nordic countries  26  40  34  4  32  48  22  51  257 
Anglo Saxon countries  26  24  25  6  23  28  13  49  194 
The Netherlands  39  32  36  1  29  32  27  39  235 
Other countries  58  32  36  7  45  44  12  84  318 
                   
Total  149  128  131  18  129  152  74  223  1004 
 
Roughly spoken, there are 3 main country groups: the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland),  Anglo-Saxon countries, and other European countries with Germany, 
France, the Netherlands and Italy as main representatives. A number of elasticities refers to 
pooled estimates for country groups, like Nordic Countries or (a sample of) OECD countries. 
The table also shows that the sample is neither complete (not all elasticities are available for all 
countries) nor uniform. The number of elasticities corresponding to The Netherlands (235) 
seems extremely high; it must be noted that 140 of these have been obtained from one 
publication: Graafland and Verbruggen (1993) estimate on average 7 elasticities for 20 
production sectors.   
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Table 4.2 supplies summary statistics of the meta sample by type of elasticity. Estimates of the 
unemployment elasticity of pay are most abundant while the elasticity of the marginal retention 
rate is relatively scarce. 
Table 4.2  Elasticities of pay by type 
  Number  Sample mean  Sample median  Standard error  Minimum  Maximum 
Labour productivity (q)  146  0.875  1  0.199  0.250  1.121 
Payroll tax(1+s)  138  – 0.659  – 0.720  0.323  – 1  0 
Average retention ratio (1− ta)  131  – 0.390  – 0.368  0.277  – 1  0.100 
Marginal retention ratio (1− tm)  18  0.226  0.200  0.245  – 0.120  0.650 
Producer price (py)  152  0.725  0.790  0.273  0  1.140 
Consumer price (pc)  129  0.657  0.774  0.363  0  1.090 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  74  0.349  0.322  0.274  0  1.080 
Unemployment rate (u)  223  – 0.089  – 0.064  0.093  – 0.498  0.160 
             
Total  1011           
 
The number of observations relating to The Netherlands (235) seems extremely high. Inspection 
of the meta samples shows that this is likely due to the inclusion of the study of Graafland and 
Verbruggen (1993), who estimate wage equations for some 20 production sectors in The 
Netherlands, resulting in 140 wage elasticities. Some numbers in table 4.3 appear as integers 
indicating that their values have been fixed a priori or restricted in the reported equation. 
Section 5.2. discusses how to account for the impact  of these econometric restrictions on 
reported elasticities of pay. 
Figures 4.2 to 4.8 illustrate the distribution of the eight types of elasticities (excluding the 
wedge variables). Numbers at the horizontal axes are midmark values. In each diagram 3 
vertical lines are drawn. The central line indicates the mean value of the elasticity; the other two 
are one standard deviation away from the mean value. There is a lot of variation in the 
diagrams: the elasticities of wages with respect to labour productivity and the unemployment 
rate are rather concentrated around their mean values. The distributions of the  elasticities of tax 
rates on the other hand tend to be more dispersed.  
From figure 4.2 it can be seen that more than 50% of the labour productivity elasticities in 
the sample was a priori set at a value of 1. Despite of this, the sample mean is about 0.86, which 
implies that the mean value of the free estimates is roughly 0.7. The data do not suggest an 
unambiguous reason for this difference. All relevant studies use time series data; in some cases 
low values correspond to specific countries (Drèze and Bean (1990), Fritsche et al. (2005), 
Guichard and Laffargue (2000)), but the data also indicate that short run elasticities tend to be 
somewhat smaller than long run values.   
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Figure 4.3 shows that 40 payroll tax elasticities have been set to −1 a priori; most of these 
correspond to wage equations in which the dependent variable is expressed as wage cost per 
employee. Apart from these values, the distribution is rather uniform. The sample mean of   
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− 0.67 indicates that 33% of a payroll tax increase is borne by the producer; 67% of the burden 
is shifted on to the employee. It is reasonable to assume that this process takes some time to 
settle; hence the short run elasticity may differ from the long run value. Furthermore, 41 out of 
128 elasticities were computed from tax wedge elasticities; the sample mean of these restricted 
estimates is about − 0.60, which implies that the mean of the unrestricted elasticities is about  
− 0.72. This difference is not that large (some 40% of the standard error) but it may be 
significant. 
From figure 4.4 it follows that the values of the elasticity of the average retention rate are 
roughly between − 0.7 and − 0.1. As in case of producer taxes, we expect short and long run 
values of the elasticity to differ. The direction of the adjustment process will be opposite, 
however: the impact on the long run will be smaller (in absolute value) than the sort term 
elasticity. The sample mean of the 41 values extracted from price wedge estimates is virtually 
the same as the overall sample mean of  − 0.39. Therefore in this case we expect that the impact 
of the restrictions is small and insignificant.  
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The sample of marginal retention rate elasticities contains 18 observations only, of which 10 
were obtained from Tyrväinen (1995b); 5 of these were put to zero after a statistical test. 
Another 4 elasticities are in the range 0.5 - 0.6. The pooled estimation of Brunello and Sonedda 
(2007) however yields very small values. It remains to be seen whether any conclusions can be 
drawn from the regressions. 
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 Figure 4.6 and 4.7 display price elasticities of the wage rate. Many publications estimate real 
wage equations; in these cases the output price or the consumer price is used as deflator and the 
corresponding wage elasticity is 1 by assumption. This can be seen from the figures: many 
values are in the interval (0.8, 1.0]. In case of py 54 elasticities are fixed to 1 by applying py as 
wage deflator; in figure 4.6 25 values of the consumer price elasticity are set to 1. Restrictions 
also play a crucial role here: 26 producer price elasticities and 27 consumer price wage  
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elasticities were obtained from regressions that include the price wedge or a combined price 
wedge and tax wedge. What do we expect from the meta-analysis? There may be a difference in 
price elasticities obtained from nominal and real wage regressions. In addition, equations that 
incorporate the role of prices through a wedge only may yield results that differ from freely 
estimated elasticities. Finally, as both prices are interrelated, one may expect that it makes a 
difference whether both are included in the wage equation or just one of them. 
Finally, figure 4.9 shows the values of the unemployment elasticity of pay. Almost 85% of 
the elasticities differs less than one standard error from the sample mean. This sample mean  is 
pretty close to the results reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Nijkamp and Poot 
(2005) and Clar et al. (2007). This is remarkable, as most of our estimates have been obtained 
from long run macro or sectoral wage equations while the well known wage curve relates real 
individual earnings to local labour market conditions. Does this support the ‘natural constant’ 
hypothesis (Card (1995))? We will explore this further on. 
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5  Set-up of the meta analysis 
5.1  Econometric modelling 
The meta sample consists of 8 series corresponding to 8 types of estimated elasticities of pay. 
The aim is to explain the variation within each series using characteristics of studies from which 
the elasticities have been obtained or computed. This is done by using dummy variables that 
cover these characteristics adequately. The type of dummy to be included depends on the source 
of variation that we expect to play a role.  
Define the set A: } { u p p t t s q c y m a , , , , 1 , 1 , 1 , ρ − − +  that contains all economic variables 
that correspond to the wage elasticities of interest. The meta sample contains 8 vectors of 
elasticities A i i ∈ , ε . The length of all vectors is the number of included wage equations. The 
variation within each vector i ε is explained by a vector of general constants αi0 and a set of N1 
dummy vectors dj (value 0 or 1). We also add N2 dummy vectors ek that cover differences 
across elasticities due to restrictions on estimated parameters in the reported wage equations. 
Finally, the N3 vectors xj represent all possible other explanatory variables:  
∑ ∑ ∑
= =
= + + + + =
3 2 1
1 1









j ij i i i v x e d … λ φ α α ε   (5.1) 
where vi is a vector of disturbance terms. In the remaining subsections we introduce possible  
dummies dj and ek and other exogenous variables xm.  
5.2  Selection of dummy variables 
Country dummies 
One reason why estimated elasticities vary across countries is the existence of institutional 
differences. These may concern the tax schedule, the organisation of the social security system, 
the relative size of various production and service sectors and so on. All these sources of 
inequality are usually summarized in country specific dummy variables. From table 4.2 
however it follows that the distribution of wage equations over countries is far from uniform. 
Therefore to begin with we opt for clustering and introduce dummy variables for the Nordic 
countries, Anglo-Saxon countries, The Netherlands and other countries.  
Time dummies 
A large share of the studies uses time series, from as early as 1952 (Alogoskoufis and Manning 
(1988)) until recent years. Elasticities may very well have changed during this 55 year period.  
  26 
To capture possible variations over time we introduce time dummies for two periods: 1950 - 
1969 and 1990 - 2008.   
Data and sector dummies 
We add a dummy that indicates whether estimates have been obtained from time series analysis 
or from other methods (cross section or panel data). The distinction between time series and 
data panels is not always transparent. A cluster of observations on 4000 firms during 3 years is 
clearly a panel, but what about a country panel that contains data from 20 countries over a time 
horizon of 25 years? Therefore, if the time dimension is much smaller than the cross section 
dimension, we consider the data to be a panel.  
It may also make sense to distinct elasticities obtained from sectoral and those computed 
from macro wage equations.  
Wage bargaining and union density 
We want to discriminate between wage equations that have been derived from a theoretical 
model that describes wages as the outcome of a bargaining process between employers and 
unions, and other models. The distinction is not always clear however, as a number of authors 
does not explicitly derive their equation from a bargaining concept but just indicate that ‘an 
equation type like ours can formally be derived from...’. In such cases we treat the estimates ‘as 
if derived from’.  
A related dummy indicates whether a specific elasticity has been obtained from an equation 
that includes union density as an explanatory variable, or not. Union density serves as a 
measure for bargaining power; it is defined as the number of union members relative to the total 
number of employees.  
Selection bias? 
Card and Krueger (1995) argue that journal editors are possibly biased towards acceptation of 
papers that contain statistically significant results. In this case however, that argument won’t 
stand up. An important share of the studies examined is not primarily concerned with wages, 
but rather unemployment. Wage elasticities are often not even reported or computed, let alone 
that standard errors can be obtained.  
Yet it may be useful to make a distinction between peer reviewed articles and working 
papers. Studies that contain inconclusive or unexpected results, or analyses that just apply a 
known specification to other data or different countries are seldomly send in to or accepted by 
scientific journals. It is not clear a priori whether this biases reported results, but to take a 
possible impact into account, we introduce a publication dummy that equals 1 only if a study 
has been published in a refereed scientific journal.   
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Single equation and system estimation 
A number of studies estimates single wage equations, some consider a system of wage and price 
equations or employment and wage equations. We introduce one dummy to indicate whether a 
single equation estimation method has been used (usually OLS) or a system estimation 
technique. 
Dynamic specification 
The dynamic specification of the reported equation will affect estimated elasticities. We 
distinguish between elasticities obtained from equations in which all variables have been 
expressed as first differences or percentage changes, those computed from level equations only 
and estimates obtained from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) equations. The latter contain 
both endogenous and exogenous variables in levels and (first) differences. Error correction 
models are a particular case of this type. Equations formulated in first differences yield short 
run elasticities only; this enables us to investigate whether the latter differ from long term 
elasticities. 
If a wage elasticity can be obtained, then by definition the 3 dummies are interrelated: their 
sum equals 1. As the first difference dummy indicates possible differences between short and 
long term elasticities, I preferred to use this dummy with either one of the two remaining ones.  
Restriction dummies 
Estimated values of wage elasticities not only depend on wage definitions and sample 
characteristics, but also on the number and kind of all explanatory variables included in the 
reported regression. Ideally, long run specifications are log linear but even so, not all estimated 
equations include all desired regressors (see also figure 4.1). An important point to note is note 
is that a number of elasticities has been fixed a priori at a value of 1. Furthermore, there are 
cross elasticity restrictions: for example, inclusion of the tax wedge into an equation implicitly 
restricts the coefficients of the payroll tax factor (1+s) and the average income retention rate (1-
ta)  to be equal (see also Appendix A). To capture all these possible sources of variation I use in 
each estimated equation an indicator that has 4 possible values for all relevant elasticities: not 
included, free estimate, restricted estimate or fixed coefficient. A restriction imposed after 
estimation and testing has been treated as a free estimate.  
The following example contains two important cases that need special attention. Suppose we  
have specifications like:  

























  (5.2) 
In the first equation of (5.2) the consumer price coefficient is both fixed (to 1) as it is used as a  
deflator and restricted (from the wedge variable). In this case the overall judgement is 
’restricted’ as its value equals β − 1 and the coefficient of py equals − β . The same holds for the 
payroll tax 1+s in the second equation of (5.2). Similar cases occur if py is used as deflator, or if  
wages net of income taxes appear on the left hand side. Table 5.1 gives an example. 
 
Table 5.1  An example of restriction dummies 
Elasticity  Indicator  F dummy  R dummy  C dummy 
         
Labour productivity  fixed  0  0  1 
Payroll taxfactor (1+s)  restricted estimate  0  1  0 
Average income retention rate (1− ta)  restricted estimate  0  1  0 
Marginal income retention rate (1− tm)  not included  0  0  0 
Producer price (py)  fixed  0  0  1 
Consumer price (pc)  not included  0  0  0 
Replacement rate (ρ)  free estimate  1  0  0 
Unemployment rate (u)  free estimate  1  0  0 
 
In table 5.1 the indicator column shows that in the reported wage equation the coefficients of 
labour productivity and the producer price are a priori fixed (C dummy equals 1), parameter 
estimates corresponding to producer and average income taxes have been restricted (their R 
dummy is 1), the marginal income retention rate and consumer price are missing and 
coefficients for the replacement and unemployment rate have been estimated freely (F dummy 
= 1). This method enables to classify all reported equations that supply wage elasticities of all 
types. The sum of the 3 dummies (F, R and C) is either 0 (if the elasticity is not observed) or 1. 
If the sum of the F, R, and C dummies equals 1, I have deleted the F dummy: a free estimate is 
the reference case.   
Exogenous variables 
Some authors (Graafland and Huizinga (1999), Peeters and den Reijer (2001, 2002), 
Kranendonk and Verbruggen (2006)) argue that the unemployment rate elasticity of pay 
depends on the level of the replacement ratio and vice versa. For instance, they suggest that a 
higher unemployment rate reduces the replacement rate elasticity of pay while on the other hand 
the impact of unemployment on wages is lower when replacement rates are high. This mutual  
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dependence can be taken into account by adding the corresponding sample averages of 
unemployment and replacement rates as explanatory variables in the meta regressions for the 
elasticities of the replacement ratio and unemployment rate, respectively. Hence, in 2 equations 
we add 1 explanatory variable xm (see equation 5.1).  
5.3  Overview and use of Dummy variables 
Overview 
Table 5.2 lists all defined dummy variables. Restriction dummies not included in the table have 
at most 5 nonzero values in the complete sample. The remaining dummies have at least 21 
nonzero values. 
 
Table 5.2  Overview of Dummy variables 
Dummy variable  Condition, value =1 
   
Country dummy The Netherlands  The Netherlands 
Dummy Anglo Saxon countries  UK,USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
Dummy Nordic countries  Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
Publication dummy  Publication in journal 
Time series dummy  Based on time series data 
System estimator dummy  Use of simultaneous equation techniques 
Bargaining dummy  Specification based on wage bargaining model 
Union density  If included in source equation 
First difference estimation  All variables in source equation in first differences 
Dummy level estimation  Source equation formulated in level variables 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag dummy  Source equation estimated in ADL format 
Sector dummy  Sectoral wage equations 
Time dummy 50-60  If mid sample year in time span 1950 - 1969 
Time dummy 90-08  If mid sample year in time span 1990 - 2008 
F dummy all relevant elasticities   If specific elasticity is freely estimated in the source equation 
R dummy producer tax  If restricted in source equation 
R dummy average retention rate  If restricted in source equation 
R dummy consumer price  If restricted in source equation 
R dummy producer price  If restricted in source equation 
C dummy labour productivity  If fixed in source equation 
C dummy producer tax  If fixed in source equation 
C dummy consumer price  If fixed in source equation 
C dummy producer price  If fixed in source equation 
 
Correlation between dummy variables 
The larger the number of dummies, the better we may be able to explain the variation in 
computed elasticities, if only they are ‘sufficiently’ independent. This depends on the specific 
data sample. It is possible that a dummy takes only one value in the sample that is relevant for a  
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certain elasticity. Some dummies may be (nearly) perfectly correlated for all observations in a 
certain sample, while their overall correlation in the complete sample is modest. As the total 
number of possible dummies exceeds 30, series should be sufficiently long.  Therefore, it is not 
always possible to explore the full set of dummy variables. 
5.4  Estimation: specification and  technique 
Specification 
We rewrite equation (5.1) by explicitly introducing the dummies discussed above: 
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in each equation we have a general constant, 13 dummy vectors dj, 7 F dummy vectors, 8 R and 
C dummy vectors (see table 5.3). In each equation at least one of the λ coefficients is zero. Each 
element of the vectors of the replacement rate ρ and the unemployment rateu equals the sample 
average of the reported study. This is a rather simple model: in 2 out of the 8 equations we use 1 
exogenous variable; all other regressors are dummies. 
From the estimated coefficients one may obtain a ‘best guess’ for each wage elasticity. To 
this end equation (5.3) can be applied with all parameters replaced by their estimated values. Of 
course, one has also to consider the preferred values of the dummy variables. Should they be set 
at 0 or 1 or is it better to take a sample mean? We will return to this point in section 6.3.   
Estimation technique 
The most straightforward method to estimate equation (5.3) is Least Squares (OLS or GLS), 
which can easily be implemented in a program like Eviews. A drawback however of Least 
Squares methods is the strong impact of outliers on estimated coefficients and standard errors. 
Preliminary regressions confirm this expectation.  
The first alternative is weighted least squares. It is common to use reported standard errors 
as weights but, as noted earlier, in many cases they are not available. Therefore I have 
constructed a common measure of the relative robustness of reported and computed elasticities. 
This weight combines 3 aspects of the elasticities: (i) the number of data points relative to the 
number of estimated parameters in the reported equation, (ii) the number of alternative 
specifications tested and (iii) the number of explanatory variables in the reported equation. Each 
aspect is valued on a 1 to 5 scale and individual scores are simply added. The results however, 
were very similar to those of standard OLS regressions.  
Therefore it may be better to use more robust techniques, like Least Absolute Deviation 
(LAD). The LAD technique belongs to the family of Quantile Regression Methods (Koenker  
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and Hallock (2001)). This estimator minimizes the sum of absolute deviations from the median 
value. The latter is not always unique and the same holds for the LAD estimator. The LAD 
estimator can be interpreted as a special case of GLS as it uses the inverse of the absolute 
residuals as regression weights (e.g. Judge et al (1985), section 7.4). As Rousseeuw and Leroy 
(1987) argue, its application yields a considerable gain in robustness, because the estimator is 
less sensible to outliers in the dependent variable than LS estimators. It’s vulnerability to 
outliers in the independent variables will not be a problem here as the values of all our 
moderator variables are in the interval (− 1, 1) (see chapter 5). 
Judge et al (1985) report some distributional properties of the LAD estimator  M β ˆ (section 
7.4).  M β ˆ is the maximum likelihood estimator if the disturbances follow a two-tailed 
















u f   (5.4) 
This density function is more peaked than the normal distribution and has fatter tails, but still 
has a finite variance. Under the assumption that (1) ut are independent, identically distributed 
random variables with a continuous distribution function F and median zero, and (2) 
Q X X T T = −
∞ → ' lim 1  is a positive definite matrix, Bassett and Koenker (1978) show that 
) ˆ ( β β − M T is asymptotically normal with mean zero and covariance matrix 1 2 − Q w , where 
2 w is the asymptotic variance of the sample median from samples with distribution F. As Judge 
et al (1985) note, the result of Basset and Koenker (1978) implies that the LAD estimator is 
asymptotically more efficient than the LS estimator for all distributions where the median is 
superior to the mean as an estimator of location.  






1 1 − =   (5.5) 
where V ˆ and V are the objective functions of the full model and the restricted model that 
contains a constant only.  
The software package Eviews computes all relevant statistics, including asymptotic standard 
errors using a Huber Sandwich method (see e.g. Freedman (2006)). Apart from these standard 
errors, we will report p-values. The latter denote the minimum size for which the null 
hypotheses that a coefficient equals zero would still be rejected. If the p-value is smaller than  
the significancy level α of the test, the null hypothesis is rejected (Verbeek (2003), page 31). 
For joint testing the hypothesis that k coefficients are zero, Eviews reports a Quasi Likelihood  
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Ratio (QLR) test, which is asymptotically χ
2(k) distributed with k the number of restrictions 
imposed by the null hypothesis (Koenker and Basset (1982)). Additional technical details can 
be found in chapter 31 of the Eviews6 manual.  
  33 
6  Overview of results 
6.1  General approach 
In each meta regression I use the complete set of dummy vectors. To prevent spurious 
correlations, dummies that only have nonzero values in less than 10% of the sample have been 
excluded from the regression.  
Section 6.2 presents a global overview of the results. A detailed description can be found in 
appendix C. This appendix also discusses results from Ordinary Least Squares regressions. 
Section 6.3 computes benchmark values for all types of elasticities using estimated coefficients 
and specific values of dummy variables. Section 6.4 explores the possibility to compute 
benchmark elasticities for wage equations that contain a wedge variable. Finally, section 6.5 
discusses benchmark elasticities obtained from system Least Squares regressions. These take 
possible correlations between elasticities obtained from the same study into account. 
6.2  Summary of outcomes 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize regression results.  
Table 6.1  Elasticities of pay: signs of coefficients and general statistics  
              Elasticity of pay corresponding to: 
  q  1+s  1− ta  1− tm  pc  py  ρ  u 
                 
Constant  ++  –   −   +  ++  ++  –   –  
The Netherlands dummy  –   –   +  +  +  –   +  –  
Anglo Saxon dummy  +  +  –   +  –   +  –   ++ 
Dummy Nordic countries  +  –   −   +  –   +  –   –  
Publication dummy  +  +  – –     +  –   +  –  
Time series dummy    –   –     –   –   ++  –  
Hourly wage dummy  +  –   +     ++  –   +  + 
Single equation estimator  +  –   +    +  +  –   + 
Bargaining dummy  –   –   –     +  –   +  + 
Union density    –         –      
First difference estimation  –   ++  –     +  –      
Level estimation  +  –   +    –   –   –   –  
Sector dummy  +  +  +     +  –   +  + 
Time dummy 1990-2008            –     + 
Volume unemployment rate              +   
Pseudo  2 R   0.169  0.413  0.169  – 0.008  0.304  0.607  0.119  0.021 
Mean value  0.875  – 0.659  – 0.390  0.226  0.725  0.657  0.349  – 0.089 
Observations  146  138  131  18  129  152  74  223 
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The tables display the signs of the estimated coefficients. Coefficients with p-values above 0.10 
have been single marked, if the p-values are smaller than 0.10, double marks have been used. 
The  2 R statistic reported is a pseudo  2 R  (section 5.3, formula (5.5), corrected for degrees of 
freedom).  
Table 6.2  Elasticities of pay: coefficients of restriction dummies  
                 Elasticity of pay corresponding to: 
  q  1+s  1− ta  py  pc  ρ  u 
               
F dummy labour productivity    –   +  –   ++  +  + 
F Dummy payroll tax  +    –   +  –   – –   –  
F Dummy average retention rate  +  –     –   +  +  –  
F Dummy marginal retention rate  +  –   –   +  –   +  –  
F Dummy consumer price  –   +  +     – –   +  + 
F Dummy producer price  +  –   –   – –     –   + 
F Dummy replacement rate  –   –   −   –   +    –  
F Dummy unemployment rate  +  –   +  ++  – –   –    
R dummy payroll tax  +  –   –   –   –   – –   + 
R dummy average retention rate  +  –   –   ++  +  +  –  
R dummy consumer price  –   ++  +  –   – –   –   –  
R dummy producer price  –   –   –   –   ++  +  –  
C Dummy labour productivity  +  +  –   –   ++  +  –  
C Dummy payroll tax  –   – –   −   +  –   –   – –  
C Dummy consumer price  +  +     +    +  + 
C Dummy producer price  +  –        ++  +  + 
 
In case of the elasticity of the marginal income retention ratio m t − 1 the sample size limits the 
number of dummies in the regression. Therefore only the country dummies have been included.  
From tables 6.1 and 6.2 and the detailed information in appendix D the following 
conclusions emerge: 
Labour productivity 
The size of the general constant is some 80% of the sample mean and its standard error is small. 
Country dummies hardly have any impact. The inclusion of the marginal retention rate into the 
wage equation substantially increases the estimate of the elasticity. The size of the C dummy of 
labour productivity indicates that wage equations that estimate this elasticity yield on average 
lower values than if it is fixed a priori (in this case: at a value of 1). 
Payroll taxes 
The results indicate a substantial difference between short and long term elasticities. Price 
variables matter especially. If the wage equation contains a price wedge, then this yields smaller 
elasticities (in absolute value). The C dummies of producer taxes and both price variables 
indicate that the unit of measurement of the wage variable has an impact on the results.  
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Equations formulated in terms of wage costs or real wages deflated by the producer price index 
result in higher elasticities (in  absolute value). Deflation of wages using the consumer price 
index decreases the absolute size of the payroll tax elasticity. 
Average income retention rate  
The overall results are similar to those of the payroll tax elasticity: long term elasticities differ 
from short term. Wage equations estimated in levels only (without any dynamics) yield 
substantially higher (i.c. less negative) elasticities.  
Marginal income retention rate 
In this the sample consists of 18 observations only. The results indicate that the sample mean 
(or median) is possibly the best estimate of the elasticity. 
Consumer prices 
The use of single equation estimation methods produces higher elasticities. The inclusion of the 
output price has a significant negative impact, which is consistent with the results on the 
elasticity of py(see below). We may conclude that if one of the prices py or pc is omitted from 
the wage equation, the elasticity of the remaining price is pushed upwards. 
Output prices 
Elasticities based on sector analysis are lower than their macro equivalents. The results also 
suggest the output price elasticity is substantially lower if the consumer price is included in the 
equation, either through a freely estimated parameter or a price wedge.  
Replacement ratio 
The sector dummy has a positive impact: the elasticity is higher than may be expected on basis 
of pure macroeconomic data. The hypothesis that the elasticity depends on the level of the 
unemployment rate (see section 5.2) finds some support: the estimated coefficients have the 
right (positive) sign, but estimated standard errors are relatively high. Just like in case of both 
tax elasticities of pay, entering tax variables through a wedge variable matters, but here the net 
impact is very modest. 
Unemployment rate 
The coefficient of the level of the replacement ratio doesn’t have the expected sign: a higher 
replacement ratio increases the absolute value of the unemployment elasticity of pay. Therefore 
the level of unemployment has been omitted from the final regression. The fit is poor and only 
the Anglo Saxon dummy provides some explanatory power. The C dummy of the payroll tax 
indicates that equations that explain wage costs (in that case the C dummy equals 1) yield  
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higher unemployment elasticities of pay in absolute value than nominal wage equations. From 
the discussion in appendix D it follows that if our observations had been obtained from simple 
regressions of the real wage on the unemployment ratio, unemployment elasticities would not 
systematically differ from what we observe now. This suggests that the size of the 
unemployment elasticities of pay from the meta analysis are comparable to those obtained from 
the wage curve literature. 
Overview  of LAD outcomes 
The results suggest that in estimating a specific elasticity of pay, variables from the set 
A:{ } u p p t t s q c y m a , , , , 1 , 1 , 1 , ρ − − +  may have an impact on the results. This mutual 
dependence is captured by the restriction dummies F, R and C. Table 6.3 summarizes this 
mutual interdependency of the estimated elasticities. Symbols refer to the type of dummy that 
embodies the relationship. To gain a clear view we have restricted the possible impact to 
dummies that show coefficients with p-values < 0.1. 
Table 6.3  Impact of restriction dummies on elasticities of pay 
Elasticity of pay              Depends on inclusion of 
  q  1+s  1− ta  1− tm  pc  py  ρ  u 
                 
Labour productivity (q)                 
Payroll taxes (1+s)    C      R       
Average retention rate (1-ta)                 
Marginal retention rate (1-tm)                 
Consumer price (pc)      R      F    F 
Producer price (py)  FC        FR  RC    F 
Replacement ratio (ρ)    R             
Unemployment rate (u)    C             
 
An obvious result is that the output price elasticity of pay depends on the inclusion of the 
consumer price in the wage equation and vice versa. Both prices also have an important impact 
on tax elasticities. The producer taxes and output prices are main determinants of wage 
elasticities.  
System LS regressions 
The regressions discussed so far are stand alone: variations in observed or computed elasticities 
within and across studies are linked to variations in moderator variables. Cross correlations 
between elasticities obtained from the same study have not been taken into account. Table 6.3 
suggests that a system regression using elasticities of pay of consumer and producer prices, 
payroll and income taxes may be promising.  
A number of important reasons hampers a meaningful comparison of the system regressions 
and the LAD estimates. First, systems regressions use only a fraction of the full data set. In the  
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example above, the common sample of price and tax elasticities contains 53 observations on 4 
elasticities, which is less than 40% of the full sample of 550 data points (see table 4.2). So the 
estimation method is more efficient, but the sample size is smaller. Second, the composition of 
the sample is different. The proportion of sectoral estimates in the common sample is higher, 
and this results in substantially lower sample means of output and consumer prices. Third, the 
relative shares of freely estimated, restricted and fixed elasticities change and this alters the 
sample means of some of the F, R, and C dummies, resulting in other values of benchmark 
elasticities. In addition, more difficulties arise due to differences in estimation method (LAD 
and LS) as well as between system and stand alone regressions. Therefore I do not report the 
regression results. In section 6.5, however, we will compare benchmark values computed from 
the system regression results with those from the single LAD and OLS regressions.   
6.3  And the winner is... 
Dummy variables 
Do the results of the meta analysis generate more structural estimates of wage elasticities than 
sample means or median values? We apply equation (5.3) to answer this question and set 
dummy variables at their ‘best’ or ‘required’ values. Obviously these values are not unique. 
First, they depend on the kind of elasticities that we are interested in. Estimates by country 
group? Short run and long run elasticities? Macro or sectoral or just an average? Second, 
structural estimates are conditional on the specification of the preferred wage equation. By 
putting F, R and C dummies at their sample means we obtain an ‘average’ result. We use all 
information of estimated elasticities: free, restricted or fixed. Hence, the benchmark values 
illustrate the use of the regression results in case the wage equation is log linear.  
The conclusions of section 6.2 on wage elasticities of prices suggests that it may not be 
correct to use full sample means for the restriction dummies of pc and py. Wage equations that 
just contain either of the two prices may yield biased elasticities for the included one. Therefore 
to compute benchmark elasticities for c ε and y ε we take the sample means of the F, R, and C 
dummies of pc and py in the common sample of both prices. In other words: to compute 
benchmark values for  c ε and y ε we use only results of wage equations that contain both price 
variables.  
The results of our analysis do not permit the rejection of a specific wage equation in favour of 
another. So if we want to empirically quantify a specific wage equation, this implies a specific 
choice of the F, R and C restriction dummies. This may lead to different benchmark values than 
those reported below. I will illustrate this point in section 6.4. Dummies are set at values as 
given in table 6.4. Details can be found in appendix C.  
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Table 6.4  Overview of Dummy variables 
Dummy variable  Preferred value 
   
Publication dummy  Sample mean 
Time series dummy  1 
Single equation estimation dummy  0 
Bargaining dummy  1 
Union density  0 
First difference dummy  0 (long run) or 1 (short run) 
Dummy level estimation  0 (short run) or sample mean (long run) 
Sector dummy  0 (macro) or 1 (aggregate) 
Time dummy 1950-1969  0 
Time dummy 1990-2008  1 
F, R and C dummies of pc and py , elasticities  u y c ε ε ε , ,   Sample mean in common sample of pc and py  
F, R and C dummies, all other cases  Sample mean in full sample 
 
Benchmark values of wage elasticities 
Tables 6.5 - 6.8 report benchmark values of all elasticities by country group: long and short run 
values, macro and average. The definition of sector is not always clear-cut: it may be a specific 
industry, or region or even type of worker. Therefore just macro and average estimated are 
presented.  
Wage elasticities of 1+s, 1− ta and 1− tm can be converted to elasticities of tax rates s, ta and 
tm using the conversion formula’s in appendix B (equation (B.19) - (B.21)). This requires 
country specific data on average producer and income tax rates (s and ta) and the marginal 
income tax rate tm.  
 
Table 6.5  Elasticities of pay for The Netherlands 
            Long term elasticity            Short term elasticity             Full sample statistics 
             
The Netherlands  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  Mean  Median 
Labour productivity (q)  0.830  0.832  0.812  0.814  0.875  1.000 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.785  – 0.754  – 0.392  – 0.361  – 0.659  – 0.720 
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.191  – 0.226  – 0.364  – 0.399  – 0.390  – 0.368 
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.272  0.272  0.272  0.272  0.226  0.200 
Consumer price (pc)  0.536  0.584  0.577  0.625  0.725  0.790 
Producer price (py)  0.393  0.342  0.334  0.282  0.657  0.774 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.400  0.472  0.400  0.472  0.349  0.322 
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Table 6.6  Elasticities of pay for Anglo Saxon countries 
          Long term elasticity          Short term elasticity            Sample statistics 
             
Anglo Saxon countries  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  Mean  Median 
Labour productivity (q)  0.919  0.921  0.901  0.903  0.875  1.000 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.726  – 0.695  – 0.333  – 0.302  – 0.659  – 0.720 
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.273  – 0.308  – 0.446  – 0.481  – 0.390  – 0.368 
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.200  0.200  0.200  0.200  0.226  0.200 
Consumer price (pc)  0.532  0.580  0.573  0.621  0.725  0.790 
Producer price (py)  0.450  0.399  0.391  0.339  0.657  0.774 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.260  0.331  0.260  0.331  0.349  0.322 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.046  – 0.043  – 0.046  – 0.043  – 0.089  – 0.064 
 
Table 6.7  Elasticities of pay for Nordic countries 
             Long term elasticity             Short term elasticity              Sample statistics 
  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  Mean  Median 
             
Labour productivity (q)  0.919  0.921  0.901  0.903  0.875  1.000 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.756  – 0.726  – 0.363  – 0.332  – 0.659  – 0.720 
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.265  – 0.300  – 0.438  – 0.472  – 0.390  – 0.368 
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.246  0.246  0.246  0.246  0.226  0.200 
Consumer price (pc)  0.472  0.520  0.513  0.561  0.725  0.790 
Producer price (py)  0.549  0.497  0.490  0.438  0.657  0.774 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.238  0.310  0.238  0.310  0.349  0.322 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.094  – 0.090  – 0.094  – 0.090  – 0.089  – 0.064 
 
Table 6.8  Elasticities of pay for other countries 
             Long term elasticity             Short term elasticity              Sample statistics 
  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  Mean  Median 
             
Labour productivity (q)  0.919  0.921  0.901  0.903  0.875  1.000 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.736  – 0.705  – 0.342  – 0.312  – 0.659  – 0.720 
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.269  – 0.304  – 0.442  – 0.477  – 0.390  – 0.368 
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.226  0.200 
Consumer price (pc)  0.532  0.580  0.573  0.621  0.725  0.790 
Producer price (py)  0.450  0.399  0.391  0.339  0.657  0.774 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.297  0.368  0.297  0.368  0.349  0.322 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.082  – 0.079  – 0.082  – 0.079  – 0.089  – 0.064 
 
In all tables long run elasticities for labour productivity are smaller than one. Values for The 
Netherlands tend to be smallest, but country specific values are close to the sample mean.  
Long and short term values of estimated tax elasticities in all countries substantially differ. 
In the short run, some 36% of an increase of producer payroll taxes is borne by employees; in 
the long run this amounts to75%. If real wages are sticky in the short run, producers adjust  
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wage offers in later periods to shift the larger part of a past increase in payroll taxes to the 
employee. This is in line with Pissarides (1998) who concludes that the impact of a cut in 
payroll taxes affects both employment and wages. If the gross replacement ratio is constant, the 
impact is mainly on wages, but if the real income out of work is fixed, the main impact is on 
employment. So an increase in real wage flexibility over time shifts the impact of a payroll tax 
cut from employment to wages.  
The opposite effect occurs in case of the average income retention ratio: the instantaneous 
impact (0.42) is about 70% higher than the long run impact (0.25 on average). If wages are 
fixed in the short run, an increase in income taxes is to a large extent borne by the employees. 
In future wage negotiations, employees (or unions) succeed in partially compensating the 
increase in income tax through higher wage claims.  
Sectoral differences matter in case of prices and replacement ratio’s. The impact on prices is 
likely connected with the competitive environment of a sector, that differs from the average 
situation. In case of the replacement ratio the fall back position for sectoral workers is to a large 
extent the alternative wage in other economic sectors, whereas the macro replacement ratio just 
refers to average unemployment and welfare benefits. Employers in a specific sector have to 
offer their employees higher wages if wages in the rest of the economy increase to prevent job 
quitting. So the elasticity may be higher than can be expected on basis of a pure macro benefit 
based replacement ratio.  
The elasticities of the marginal retention ratio are clustered around the sample mean, but the 
average elasticity for the group of other countries is close to zero. Maybe this is due to the small 
sample size. In this case it may be better to use the sample median instead. 
In all tables the sum of the two price elasticities is close to 1. If I took sample means of the 
complete sample, this would yield higher values of the price elasticities (the sum would be 
about 1.5). If either of the two prices is used to deflate wages (C dummy equals 1) or if the 
wage equation contains a price wedge (R dummies are equal to 1) different benchmark values 
may result. 
Benchmark values of unemployment elasticities of pay are not very sensitive to the choice 
of the F, R and C dummies of py and pc. Using full sample dummies yields values that are 0.03 
lower  in absolute value than those reported above. On average, Anglo Saxon unemployment 
elasticities are about 50% lower than in case of  other countries. A reason may be that the Anglo 
Saxon type of welfare state is less generous than those in other countries (Esping Andersen 
(1990)). The lower the real unemployment benefits, the stronger the incentive to look for a new 
job in case of unemployment and the lower the reservation wage. So an additional rise in 
unemployment may have a lesser impact on search intensity and wages than in more generous  
welfare states like those of Nordic countries and The Netherlands.  
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6.4  Wages and wedges 
Real wages and the price wedge 
One of the factors that we have explored to link differences in the computed value of a 
particular wage elasticity is the specification of the corresponding reported wage equation: do 
restrictions on estimated coefficients matter? Restrictions may also implicitly be imposed in the 
data transformations of real wages, wage costs or net wages into gross wages. Therefore 
benchmark values of wage elasticities may depend on settings of the moderator variables, 
notably the F, R and C dummies. The previous section applied sample means for these 
restriction dummies. Is it possible to use the results of the meta analysis to obtain more specific 
benchmark elasticities, for example related to elasticities of the real wage? 
We will discuss this by computing wage elasticities in a particular case. First, we impose 
that the wage elasticity of labour productivity equals 1. In the second step we also require that 
the elasticities of output and consumer prices add up to 1. As we will see, the resulting wage 
elasticities can be seen as benchmark values of real wage elasticities if the wage equation is 
linear in log’s. 
To compute benchmark values if  1 = q ε  requires that the C dummy of labour productivity 
equals 1 and the corresponding F and R dummies are zero. A value of 1 for the C dummy of 
productivity only indicates that the elasticity of the labour productivity is fixed, without 
specifying a particular value. In the meta sample the value always equals 1 in this case. Table 
6.9 displays the results for benchmark values of the macro wage elasticities if  1 = q ε .  
Table 6.9  Benchmark values of macro wage elasticities if  , 1 = q ε long and short term  
  The Netherlands  Anglo Saxon countries  Nordic countries  Other countries 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.910  0.892  0.999  0.981  0.999  0.981  0.999  0.981 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.716  – 0.323  – 0.657  – 0.264  – 0.688  – 0.294  – 0.667  – 0.274 
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.329  – 0.502  – 0.411  – 0.584  – 0.403  – 0.576  – 0.407  – 0.580 
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.272  0.272  0.200  0.200  0.246  0.246  0.011  0.011 
Consumer price (pc)  0.534  0.575  0.530  0.571  0.470  0.511  0.530  0.571 
Producer price (py)  0.465  0.405  0.521  0.462  0.620  0.561  0.521  0.462 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.525  0.525  0.384  0.384  0.362  0.362  0.421  0.421 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.090  – 0.090  – 0.052  – 0.052  – 0.100  – 0.100  – 0.089  – 0.089 
 
The first row shows that the restriction 1 = q ε is not exactly reproduced in case of The 
Netherlands. As we will se below (table 6.10), the sample mean of the C dummy of labour 
productivity is just above 0.2; nevertheless the extrapolation towards a value of 1 is quite good. 
Second, other elasticities also change, but not that much. The sum of both price elasticities is 
for all countries in the range 1.0 - 1.1, which is slightly higher than reported in tables 6.5 - 6.8. 
It is still reasonable to impose our second restriction that this sum equals 1.   
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Suppose we have concluded from a theoretical model or a literature review that our preferred 
wage equation is log linear in its arguments. Then, if we impose the restrictions 1 = q ε and 
1 = + y c ε ε , we may rewrite this equation as (see also appendix A, equation (A.5)): 
u p
p t t s q W
u y c
c c m m a a s
ln ln ln ) 1 (
ln ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ln ln 1 1 1
ε ρ ε ε
ε ε ε ε
ρ + + −
+ + − + − + + + = − − +
  (6.1) 
or: 
u




c m m a a s
y
ln ln
ln ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ln ln 1 1 1
ε ρ ε
ε ε ε ε
ρ +
+ Π + − + − + + + = − − +
  (6.2) 
Note that, given that specification (6.1) is the true model elasticities in equation (6.2) refer to 
real wages. In this case the restrictions imply that the impact of prices on the real wage is fully 
captured by the price wedge. Note that from table 6.5 - 6.7 one may conclude that the sum of 
the benchmark values of both price elasticities is close to 1. This does not imply however, that 
equation (6.2) is necessarily true. The implicit assumption is that the output price is independent 
of the right hand side variables in equation (6.2) and on wages.  
We mimic the restrictions by setting the R dummies of both prices to 1 which just indicates 
that estimated coefficients are restricted. In most cases this indeed refers to a price wedge; but 
some equations in the sample are even more restrictive as they impose equal elasticities for 
price and tax wedges. Table 6.10 summarizes all restrictions on moderator values that are 
implied by equation (6.2).  
The sample mean of each dummy, given that elasticity i is observed differs from the mean 
value in case we observe elasticity j; see table B.1 in appendix B. The weighted sample mean is 
computed using the number of observations on each elasticity as weight. The table shows that 
restricted dummy values may substantially differ from the full sample means. Table 6.11 
displays the resulting benchmark elasticities. 
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Table 6.10  Dummy restrictions corresponding to equation (6.2) 
Wage elasticity  Dummy type  Range of sample means  Weighted sample mean  Restricted value 
         
Labour productivity  F  0.3 - 0.7  0.430  0 
Labour productivity  R  0.0  0.000  0 
Labour productivity  C  0.1 - 0.3  0.228  1 
Consumer price  F  0.3 - 0.6  0.473  0 
Consumer price  R  0.0 - 0.7  0.244  1 
Consumer price  C  0.0 - 0.1  0.037  0 
Output price  F  0.3 - 0.7  0.543  0 
Output price  R  0.1 - 0.7  0.230  1 
Output price  C  0.0 - 0.4  0.111  0 
 
Compared to earlier results, a number of things has changed: 
(i)  the elasticity of labour productivity is lower than before, but still close to 1 for most 
countries; 
(ii) the sum of the wage elasticities of pc and py is about 1.0, except for The Netherlands  
(= 0.95). 
(iii) elasticities of the average income retention rate (1− ta) have increased in size, both in the 
long and the short run; 
 
Table 6.11  Benchmark values of macro real wage elasticities in equation (6.2), long and short term  
  The Netherlands  Anglo Saxon countries  Nordic countries  Other countries 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.842  0.824  0.931  0.913  0.931  0.913  0.931  0.913 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.522  – 0.129  – 0.463  – 0.070  – 0.493  – 0.100  – 0.473  – 0.079 
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.419  – 0.592  – 0.501  – 0.674  – 0.493  – 0.666  – 0.497  – 0.670 
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.272  0.272  0.200  0.200  0.246  0.246  0.011  0.011 
Consumer price (pc)  0.398  0.439  0.394  0.435  0.334  0.375  0.394  0.435 
Producer price (py)  0.554  0.495  0.611  0.552  0.709  0.650  0.611  0.552 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.115  0.115  – 0.025  – 0.025  – 0.047  – 0.047  0.012  0.012 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.133  – 0.133  – 0.095  – 0.095  – 0.143  – 0.143  – 0.131  – 0.131 
 
(iv) payroll tax elasticities are substantially smaller in absolute value; − 0.38 in the long run and 
slightly positive in the short run. 
(v) unemployment elasticities of pay almost double in size; 
(vi) the elasticity of the replacement rate falls down to almost zero or becomes even negative. 
The earlier outcomes of tables 6.7 - 6.9 virtually obey the restrictions imposed; why do the 
results of table 6.11 differ so much? The first reason may be that output prices and wages are 
mutually dependent: in this case real wage elasticities differ from nominal wage elasticities.  
Second, from table 6.10 it follows that the number of restrictions on dummies (9) is relatively 
high; in this case our extrapolations may lose accuracy. Finally our sample is not balanced: the  
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number of observations differs across elasticities and some wage equations are more ‘complete’ 
than others; see figure 4.1. In other words: the thickness of the ice is not uniform: if we impose 
too many restrictions we move away from the safe place and get in thin ice. This may explain 
the unexpected values for the replacement rate elasticity: the number replacement elasticities 
obtained from a real wage equation that contains a price wedge is only 2.    
Some preliminary conclusions may be drawn: 
(i) elasticities of nominal and real wages generally differ, notably with respect to taxes, net 
replacement rates and the unemployment rate; 
(ii) price elasticities based on nominal and real wage equations are roughly the same. If the sum 
of both price elasticities of the nominal wage is close to one, it may not be bad to  assume that 
this will also hold in case of price elasticities of the real wage; 
(iii) the elasticity of producer taxes is highly sensitive to the deflation of wages. A possible 
explanation is that output prices react on changes in producer taxes. In this case we may write 
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or: 
s s y s E + + + + = 1 1 1 ε ω ε   (6.4) 
The total payroll tax elasticity of wages s E + 1 equals the partial elasticity s + 1 ε plus the product of 
the output price elasticity of wages y ε and the payroll tax elasticity of the output price s + 1 ω . If 
we assume that the latter is positive, it follows that | | | | 1 1 s s E + + < ε . 
(iv) The unemployment elasticity of pay is more than doubled. From table D.7 in appendix D it 
follows that the estimated coefficients of the R dummies of pc and py are substantial, but highly 
insignificant. Inspection of the sample shows that only 19 out of 223 observations of the 
unemployment elasticity of pay refer to wage equations that contain a price wedge. Therefore 
not much value should be attached to the reported unemployment elasticity in table 6.11. 
The tax wedge and Dalton’s law 
A number of authors (Layard et al (1991), Bean et al (1986)) argue that the key variable that 
explains the distortion of labour taxes on wage formation is the tax wedge. This is in line with 
the “most basic theorem of public finance” (Blinder(1988)) that if a tax is levied in a perfect 
competitive market (with fixed labour supply) it does not matter who pays the tax on labour: it 
is the gap between payroll and employee taxes that matters. This result is known as Dalton’s  
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law (Muysken et al (1999). The law implies that a neutral shift from producer payroll taxes to 
income tax has no impact on employment and wages.  
This neutral shift can be defined in two ways (Goerke (2000)). When the shift leaves total 
tax revenue unchanged, the law does not hold if the shift affects the structure of the tax system, 
e.g. when the tax bases are unequal due to income tax allowances (Koskela and Schöb (1999)). 
An alternative tax shift leaves the tax wedge unchanged. Goerke (2000) uses this definition to 
apply Dalton’s law to social security taxes. He argues that if labour supply depends on the 
alternative income (e.g. an unemployment benefit), the wedge neutral tax shift will lower the 
net replacement ratio if unemployment benefits are also subject to social security taxes. Do the 
meta results add something to this discussion? 
From section 6.3 it follows that an increase in payroll taxes is partly shifted to employees: 
the long run wage elasticity exceeds its short run value. A rise in the average retention ratio 
however dampens out: the long run elasticity is smaller in size than the short run. These results  
confirm the common view that shifting the tax burden takes time, and so Dalton’s law may hold 
in the long run only.  
Now the results of table 6.5 - table 6.7 all indicate that the sum of the elasticities of payroll 
tax and the average income retention rate is virtually − 1: 
1 1 1 − = + − + a s ε ε   (6.5) 
Given the restriction in (6.5), we may rewrite a log linear wage equation like (3.5) as: 
u p p t t q W u y y c c m m a s q ln ln ln ln ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ln ln ln 1 1 ε ρ ε ε ε ε ε ε ρ + + + + − + − − Λ + = − +  (6.6) 
where the tax wedgeΛ is defined in equation (4.1). We may rewrite (6.5) in terms of gross 
wage costs or net wages: 
u p p t q t W
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  (6.7) 
A wedge neutral shift in taxes may alter gross wage costs and net wages through a change in the 
marginal retention ratio and the net replacement ratio. Let’s examine the numerical 
consequences and compute benchmark values given the restriction (6.5). This can be done by 
setting the R dummies for (1+s) and (1− ta) to 1 (and F and C dummies to 0). Table 6.12 
displays the results.    
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Table 6.12  Benchmark values of macro real wage elasticities in equation (6.7), long and short term  
  The Netherlands  Anglo Saxon countries  Nordic countries  Other countries 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.894  0.876  0.983  0.965  0.983  0.965  0.983  0.965 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.687  – 0.294  – 0.629  – 0.236  – 0.659  – 0.266  – 0.638  – 0.245 
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.238  – 0.411  – 0.321  – 0.493  – 0.312  – 0.485  – 0.316  – 0.489 
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.272  0.272  0.200  0.200  0.246  0.246  0.011  0.011 
Consumer price (pc)  0.607  0.648  0.603  0.644  0.543  0.584  0.603  0.644 
Producer price (py)  0.388  0.329  0.445  0.386  0.544  0.484  0.445  0.386 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.198  0.198  0.057  0.057  0.035  0.035  0.094  0.094 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.095  – 0.095  – 0.057  – 0.057  – 0.105  – 0.105  – 0.094  – 0.094 
 
The sum of  s + 1 ε and  a − 1 ε is indeed close to 1 in the long run. The elasticity of the replacement 
ratio declines but is still above 0.2 in most countries. Elasticities of labour productivity and 
prices are somewhat higher, and the unemployment elasticity is stable. 
Even a wedge neutral shift from payroll tax to income tax that does not change the average 
tax burden on the average wage, increases the tax burden on unemployment and welfare 
benefits: the net replacement ratio declines. This results from the reduction in the tax credit or 
tax exemption that is imposed to induce the shift. This can be avoided of course, but in that case  
the marginal tax rate will increase. 
From the table it follows that both the elasticity of the marginal income retention rate and 
the elasticity of the replacement rate differ from zero. So wages will mainly be affected through 
changes in the tax structure and the replacement ratio. There may also be indirect effects though 
changes in (un)employment and output prices.  
6.5  System LS regressions 
As outlined in section 6.2, possible correlations between elasticities obtained from the same 
wage equation have not been taken into account so far. Table 6.3 suggests that wage elasticities 
of price and tax variables may be mutually dependent and the same possibly holds for 
elasticities of prices and unemployment. To investigate this I relaxed the assumption of 
independence of the error terms across meta regressions (see equation (5.3)). For each 
observation in the common sample of { } y c a s ε ε ε ε , , , 1 1 − +  and { } y c u ε ε ε , ,  I now assume 
that the disturbance terms of the concerning meta regressions have a common covariance matrix 
that is the same for each observation. Recall that this exactly implies that elasticities obtained 
from the same study are correlated, and that inter study correlations are neglected. The first 
subsystem contains 63 common observations, the second system includes 48. From the 
regression results I computed benchmark elasticities using the dummy settings from table 6.4. 
Tables 6.13 - 6.16 summarize the results. For comparison elasticities from LAD and OLS 
regressions have been included as well.   
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Table 6.13  Benchmark values of macro wage elasticities, long and short term  
The Netherlands  LAD  OLS  system 1  system 2 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0,830  0,812  0,811  0,712         
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0,777  – 0,384  – 0,753  – 0,273  – 0,743  – 0,326     
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0,185  – 0,357  – 0,280  – 0,452  – 0,235  – 0,522     
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0,272  0,272  0,272  0,272         
Consumer price (pc)  0,414  0,455  0,422  0,434  0,451  0,485  0,554  0,554 
Producer price (py)  0,415  0,356  0,505  0,328  0,380  0,364  0,357  0,357 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0,250  0,250  0,346  0,346         
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0,087  – 0,087  – 0,130  – 0,130      – 0,099  – 0,099 
 
Table 6.14  Benchmark values of macro wage elasticities, long and short term  
Anglo Saxon countries  LAD  OLS  system 1  system 2 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.919  0.901  0.911  0.812         
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.719  – 0.326  – 0.719  – 0.239  – 0.648  – 0.231     
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.267  – 0.440  – 0.380  – 0.552  – 0.400  – 0.688     
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.200  0.200  0.278  0.278         
Consumer price (pc)  0.410  0.451  0.354  0.366  0.426  0.460  0.571  0.571 
Producer price (py)  0.472  0.413  0.578  0.401  0.536  0.520  0.470  0.470 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.109  0.109  0.040  0.040         
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.049  – 0.049  – 0.087  – 0.087      – 0.032  – 0.032 
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Table 6.15  Benchmark values of macro wage elasticities, long and short term  
Nordic Countries  LAD  OLS  system 1  system 2 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.919  0.901  0.952  0.853         
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 
0.749  – 0.356  – 0.830  – 0.350  – 0.764  – 0.347     
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 
0.258  – 0.431  – 0.346  – 0.518  – 0.353  – 0.640     
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.246  0.246  0.273  0.273         
Consumer price (pc)  0.350  0.391  0.442  0.454  0.677  0.710  0.876  0.876 
Producer price (py)  0.570  0.511  0.579  0.402  0.274  0.258  0.161  0.161 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.087  0.087  0.081  0.081         
Unemployment rate (u)  – 
0.097  – 0.097  – 0.126  – 0.126      – 0.103  – 0.103 
 
Table 6.16  Benchmark values of macro wage elasticities, long and short term  
Other Countries  LAD  OLS  system 1  system 2 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.919  0.901  0.902  0.803         
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.728  – 0.335  – 0.685  – 0.204  – 0.541  – 0.124     
Average income tax (1− ta)  – 0.263  – 0.436  – 0.354  – 0.526  – 0.392  – 0.680     
Marginal income tax (1− tm)  0.011  0.011  0.149  0.149         
Consumer price (pc)  0.410  0.451  0.490  0.502  0.575  0.608  0.731  0.731 
Producer price (py)  0.472  0.413  0.539  0.362  0.373  0.357  0.307  0.307 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.146  0.146  0.176  0.176         
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.086  – 0.086  – 0.125  – 0.125      – 0.097  – 0.097 
 
Tax elasticities are not very sensitive to the estimation method: the difference between short and 
long term values emerges from all regressions. The sum of the long term elasticities of 1+s and 
1− ta is still close to 1. Short term elasticities of the average retention rate tend to be higher in 
least squares regressions, however.  
Although the sum of the wage elasticities of pc and py is fairly stable, in the system 
regressions the elasticity of the consumer price tends to increase, leading to low values of  y ε , 
especially in case of the Nordic countries. Benchmark elasticities of the unemployment 
elasticity of pay obtained from the system regressions confirm the earlier conclusions that the 
size of the elasticity in Anglo Saxon countries is roughly half  that of other country groups.  
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7  Conclusions 
7.1  General findings 
A meta analysis is a quantitative instrument to support a literature survey. Did it give any 
support? The answer is clearly yes. One of the merits of this meta analysis is that it shows that 
best values may differ from sample statistics like the mean and median. The reason is of course 
that variation is not just white noise, it is in part systematic. One of the conclusions is that part 
of the variation is due to different specifications of the reported wage equations. Moderator 
variables should not just include institutional, time or regional dummies, but also variables that 
account for different specifications. Moreover, it matters how coefficients have been estimated 
also holds in this case. Fixing a price variable for example, may result in a different value for 
the unemployment elasticity of pay. 
As to the latter, our findings confirm those found in the literature on wage curves. Sample 
means, median values and elasticities obtained from this analysis yield values that are close to 
the findings of  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Nijkamp and Poot (2005) and Clar et al 
(2007).  
In a number of cases we also found differences between short and long term elasticities. The 
impact of changes in the average retention rate declines in the long run, while the impact of 
producer payroll taxes and productivity changes gain strength in the long term. These findings 
are confirmed using Least Squares regressions of a cluster of elasticities. 
Finally, the ‘best’ values computed in section 6 may provide a guideline in calibrating 
empirical models. Alternative computations using OLS or LS system regressions confirm the 
main conclusions. The range of values gives some indication of the reliability of the results.  
7.2  A dozen do’s and don’t’s 
A meta analysis has a spill-over effect: you get aware of things you already knew, but which 
tend to slip away to a mouldy part of your memory. Here are some:  
 
1 Limit your research: read what you need, not anything that might be of interest. 
 
2 To get an idea of what you need, look for books, overviews an meta analyses of others.  
 
3 Restrict your time: every extra day may yield an unseen paper with new information, but, as 
Shakespeare said: enough is enough.   
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4 Believe a lot, but not everything. Beware of outliers that will make an alien dummy highly 
significant.  
 
5 Beware of the t-statistics syndrome: they do not tell you whether your specification is correct 
or not. An important variable may show little variation in your sample, but that does not imply 
that related policy reforms will have no impact.  
 
6 A meta analysis may go beyond your field of expertise. Call in experts, and test your findings.  
 
7 There are certainly more possible specifications of your regressions than bus stops. Therefore 
it’s better to carefully plan your route, than to stop everywhere. 
 
8 In selecting relevant literature, don’t rely on a single scope, like scanning articles ‘wage 
equations’. Screening on titles may be misleading. Many useful wage equations have been 
estimated to gain insight in unemployment, inflation, tax reforms. 
 
9 About 90% of your time will be spent on reading and ordering (Stanley(2001)). Therefore, 
organize your database well. Record anything and every step you made.  
 
10 It proved to be very useful not only to setup a database with all sort of descriptive statistics, 
but also a comprehensive separate review that highlights the main characteristics of the papers.   
 
11 If you have to transform your relevant variable, don’t forget that many spectacular insights 
tend to be based on computation errors.  
 
12 If your material is inconclusive, it is! 
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Appendix A Wage definitions and the wage equation 
This appendix deals with the derivation of wage elasticities from generally specified wage 
equations (A.1), the transformation of wage elasticities to elasticities of the gross yearly wage 
per employee (A.2) and the relation between elasticities obtained from general log linear wage 
equations and log linear equations that contain tax or price wedges (A.3). Finally, it illustrates 
why I have omitted elasticities linked to an import price wedge rather than the ratio of consumer 
and producer prices (A.4) and how to derive elasticities if one of the explanatory variables is 
not expressed in logarithmic form (A.5).  
A.1  Long term elasticities in a general wage equation 
If we are interested in N wage elasticities N i i , , 1 , … = ε , how can they be obtained from 
empirical equations? First, we divide all possible regressors of published wage equations into 
two subsets. The first, with general element Xi, contains all variables linked to the desired 
elasticities. All other possible explanatory variables are denoted as Zj ( j=1,..., M). Then a 
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here F(.), G, Hi(.) and Kj(.) are general functional forms and α(L), βi(L), and γj(L) are lag 
polynomials. L is the lag operator, defined by 
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for any time-dependent variable V.  
Equation (A.1) is very general and so we make some suitable assumptions that directly 
relate coefficients to long run elasticities. First we assume that the function G(.) is additively 
separable in its arguments. Second, we adopt a specification that directly links elasticities to 
parameter values, i.e. a  log-linear specification. Finally, we state that the equation can be 
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This is just a convenient way to summarize the empirical results; it does not necessarily imply 
that I have only used outcomes of studies that adopt the formulation of equation (A.3). From 
section 4 it follows that there are many ways to specify the left hand variable of the wage 
equation (‘wage’). If the specification is log-linear then it is rather straightforward to rewrite it  
in terms of one suitable definition, like ‘gross wages’ or ‘wage costs’ (see below).  
If we normalize the polynomial α(L) by putting α0 to 1, then the long run elasticity with 

















ε   (A.4) 
where βki is the k-th coefficient of the lag polynomial βi(L), i.e. the coefficient of Xi(t− k). Once 
the elasticities have been computed, we can relate them to a log linear version of a long run 
wage equation: 
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  (A.5) 
In equation (A.5) the parameters ε indicate long run elasticities of pay; explanatory variables Zj 
(j=1,...,M) (including a general constant) have been omitted for simplicity. This formulation can 
easily be used to transform elasticities relating to all types of wage definitions in table 3.1 into 
elasticities of the yearly gross wage per employee W.  
A.2  Equations containing wedge variables 
In empirical studies, even if  the equation is log-linear, the analytical form of the right hand side 
variables may differ from the specification in equation (B.5). One may for example include the 
tax wedge Λ,  the price wedge Π and the degree of tax progression τp (Jacobson (1994)) into the 
wage equation:    
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  (A.6) 
Equation (A.6) can easily be transformed into the format of (A.5) using the definitions of the 
wedge variables Λ and Π and the degree of tax progression. In equation (A.6) one would 
possibly expect the coefficients of the separate tax variables ( 3 β and  4 β ), and the price 
variables ( 6 β and  7 β ) to be zero as in that case (A.6) can still be rewritten in the form of  
equation (A.5). The opposite does however not hold: if  3 β , 4 β , 6 β and 7 β are set to zero 
equation (A.6) is more restrictive than (A.5).  
A.3  Transformations to elasticities of the gross yearly wage 
From hourly to yearly wages 
Suppose that extra remunerations are proportional to hourly wages. If the total number of hours 
worked per employee per year y h is independent of the hourly wage, one may write yearly gross 
wage per employee W in terms of  the wage rate h W : 
y
h h v W W ) 1 ( + =   (A.7) 
with v the additional payments per hour worked, expressed as share of the hourly wage rate.  
Now denote the elasticity of the hourly wage rate h W with respect to production per hour h q by 
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using (A.8) we may write equation (A.5) as:  
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From equation (A.9) one may conclude that the labour productivity elasticities of pay based 
upon hourly  h
q ε and yearly wages  q ε are similar, given that extra remunerations are 
proportional to the hourly wage rate and that changes in total number of hours worked are taken 
into account in the yearly wage equation. Quarterly or monthly wages can be treated similarly.  
Wage costs and real wages 
The transformation of wage costs and real wage definitions to nominal wages is more 
straightforward. Using the appropriate definitions it is easy to see which elasticities are affected 
by a transformation and by how much. Denoting gross wage costs by  p W they can be written 
as: 
) 1 ( s W W p + =      (A.10) 
p W is also known as the producer wage, s is the payroll tax rate paid by the producer. Equation 
(A.10) implies that the payroll tax elasticity of wage costs equals 1+ s ε : positive and smaller 
than 1. Other elasticities are unaffected by the transformation. 
From now on by assumption ‘real’ refers to the use of the output price y p as deflator. So real 
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The net wage per employee  N W equals gross wage times the average retention ratio a t − 1 , with 















)   (A.12) 
So the net wage elasticity of  a t − 1 equals the gross wage elasticity plus 1. The real consumer 
wage is commonly defined as the after tax wage of the employee ( C W ) deflated by the 
consumption price index  c p :  
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  (A.13) 
and hence equals the real net wage times the inverse of the price wedge.   
A.4  Equivalence between equations (A.5) and (A.6) 
Recall the specification of the long run wage equation (A.5): 
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  (A.14) 
An alternative formulation includes the tax wedge Λ, the price wedge Π and the degree of tax 
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Let us explore the relation between elasticities ε from (A.14) and β from (A.15). First, we 
concentrate on differences due to the use of the tax wedge Λ and the degree of tax progression 
τp .There are 7 possible cases. 
 
(i)  0 1 1 1 > + + − − + m a s ε ε ε  
 
One may rewrite (A.15) as: 
… + − + + + − − Λ = − − + − + ) 1 ( ln ) ( ) 1 ( ln ln ln 1 1 1 1 1 m m a s p a s W τ ε ε ε τ ε ε   (A.16) 
(ii)  0 1 1 1 < + + − − + m a s ε ε ε  
 
Now we obtain:  
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… + − + + + − + Λ = − − + − + ) 1 ( ln ) ( ) 1 ( ln ln ln 1 1 1 1 1 a m a s p m s W τ ε ε ε τ ε ε   (A.17) 
(iii)  0 1 1 1 = + + − − + m a s ε ε ε  
 
In this case (A.15) can be written as: 
… + − + Λ = − + ) 1 ( ln ln ln 1 1 p m s W τ ε ε   (A.18) 
(iv)  0 , 0 1 1 1 > + = − − + m a s ε ε ε  
 
This is a special case of  (i). Now (A.15) equals: 
… + − + + − − = − − − ) 1 ( ln ) ( ) 1 ( ln ln 1 1 1 m m a p a W τ ε ε τ ε   (A.19) 
(vi)  0 , 0 1 1 1 < + = − − + m a s ε ε ε   
 
This follows from case (ii), (A.15) becomes: 
… + − + + − = − − − ) 1 ( ln ) ( ) 1 ( ln ln 1 1 1 a m a p m W τ ε ε τ ε   (A.20) 
(vii)  0 1 = −m ε  
 
In this case (A.16) or (A.17) applies (with 0 1 = −m ε ) depending on the sign of  a s − + + 1 1 ε ε . 
Equations (A.16) to (A.20) relate values of  a s − + 1 1 ,ε ε and  m − 1 ε to estimates of   4 1, β β … .  
If the price wedge П enters the specification we have only three possibilities 
 
(i)  y c ε ε <  
 
and (A.15) becomes 
… … + + + Π + = y c y c p W ln ) ( ln log ε ε ε   (A.21) 
(ii)  y c ε ε >  
 
and we obtain 
… … + − + Π − = c y c y p W ln ) ( ln log ε ε ε   (A.22)  
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(iii)  y c ε ε =  
 
In this case we rewrite (A.15) as: 
… … + Π + = ln ln c W ε   (A.23)  
In addition, it holds that  ρ ε β = 8 and  u ε β = 9 .  
A special case applies if  1 = + y c ε ε . No matter of the size of both elasticities (as long as 
both are nonnegative) we may write the wage equation as: 
… … + Π + = ln ln c
y p
W
ε   (A.24) 
In some studies the product of the tax and the price wedge is used (e.g. Calmfors and Forslund 
(1991), Carruth and Schnabel(1993), Holmlund and Zetterberg(1991)). This just imposes an 
additional restriction on estimated coefficients.  
The definition of the tax wedge Λ has been used to compute separate elasticities for the 
payroll tax and the average retention rate from 46 reported tax wedge elasticities. Similarly, 26 
reported price wedge elasticities have been decomposed into a consumer and a producer price 
component. 
A.5  Conversion of tax elasticities 
Wage elasticities of tax variables 1+s, 1-ta and 1-tm  ( m a s − − + 1 , 1 1 , ε ε ε ) can easily be rewritten in 




















= 1 1 1 1
1






































= 1 1 1 ) 1 (
1







− = 1 1
ε ε   (A.27) 
The import price wedge 
In a number of papers the consumer price does not enter the wage equation; its influence is 
captured by the import price pm and the tax rate on consumption (Padoa Schioppa (1990), 
Carruth and Oswald(1987)). An alternative way to add import price pm and the tax rate on  
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consumption is to include the import  price wedge pm /py and the consumption tax rate c t in the 
total wedge. How do we deal with this? 
First note that our main interest is not in the import price or the consumer tax elasticity of 
pay. In case of the inclusion of the import price wedge, the consumer price also enters the 
equation. Suppose pc is a combination of output price py and the price of intermediate imports 
pm and the consumption tax rate tc: 
( ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( c m y c t p p p + − + = α α   (A.28) 
where 1 0 < <α . Then: 
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  (A.29) 
Although (A.29) links the price wedge and the import price wedge, it is not straightforward to 
relate the estimated wage elasticities of pm / py and pc / py. Therefore if the occasion arises we do 
not use the estimated coefficient of the import price wedge to construct price elasticities of pay.  
A.6  An example: single logarithmic forms 
If wage equations are specified in the double logarithmic form (A.15) or (A.16) estimated 
coefficients are elasticities. If not, we need additional information on the size of economic 
variables like the unemployment rate or tax rates to compute elasticities. Nickell and Nunziata 
(2001) provide a very useful labour market institution data base. This contains information 
about the evolution of labour market variables like unemployment rate, replacement rate and tax 
rates in twenty OECD countries from 1960 to 1995. How do we apply these data?  
Suppose we have a wage equation that contains the income tax rate and unemployment rate 
as explanatory variables, but not in log’s: 
… … + + + = u W a 2 1 ln α τ α   (A.30) 























2   (A.31) 
And in case of the average retention rate  a τ − 1 :  




























1   (A.32) 
In (A.30) u equals some value of the unemployment rate; it is common to take the average value 
over the reported sample period, that can usually be computed from the Nickell and Nunziata 
(2001) OECD data base. Data on average tax or retention rates required to apply (A.24) are not 
included however, so they must be computed directly from OECD or National Accounts. In that 
case we take the value in the mid-year of the sample.   
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Appendix B Dummy sample means 
 
Table B.1 displays sample means of all dummies for each elasticity of pay. Ideally, the sample 
average is about 0.5, as this implies that the sample contains an equal number of both values (0 
and 1). Very small (close to 0) or large (close to 1) indicate that there is not much variation in 
the dummy.  
The final column (‘mean’) shows a weighted average using the number of observations (last 
row) as weights. To avoid spurious correlation a simple rule of thumb is applied to decide 
whether a dummy should be used as regressor. If the sample mean is smaller than 0.1 or the 
absolute number of nonzero values is less than 10, the dummy is excluded.  
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− − − − able B.1  Dummy sample means by type of elasticity of pay 
  Elasticity of pay   
  q  1+s  1− ta  1− tm  pc  py  ρ  u  mean 
                   
The Netherlands dummy  0.260  0.232  0.275  0.056  0.225  0.211  0.365  0.175  0.231 
Anglo Saxon dummy  0.178  0.203  0.191  0.333  0.178  0.184  0.176  0.220  0.196 
Dummy Nordic countries  0.178  0.304  0.260  0.222  0.248  0.316  0.297  0.229  0.256 
Publication dummy  0.425  0.587  0.603  0.333  0.636  0.526  0.689  0.570  0.562 
Time series dummy  1.000  0.978  0.939  0.833  0.953  0.987  0.959  0.942  0.962 
Single equation estimator  0.582  0.587  0.435  0.111  0.473  0.553  0.703  0.520  0.532 
Hourly wage dummy  0.144  0.239  0.160  0.111  0.194  0.178  0.257  0.318  0.217 
Bargaining dummy  0.719  0.710  0.832  0.389  0.597  0.730  0.824  0.628  0.700 
Union density  0.021  0.065  0.076  0.056  0.047  0.046  0.108  0.049  0.054 
First difference estimation  0.082  0.087  0.168  0.000  0.171  0.138  0.000  0.004  0.089 
Level estimation  0.205  0.239  0.267  0.167  0.194  0.197  0.365  0.161  0.217 
ADL dummy  0.712  0.674  0.565  0.833  0.636  0.664  0.635  0.834  0.694 
Sector dummy  0.247  0.406  0.382  0.222  0.318  0.342  0.486  0.247  0.326 
Time dummy 1950 - 1969  0.021  0.029  0.038  0.000  0.062  0.026  0.014  0.022  0.030 
Time dummy 1990 - 2008  0.233  0.152  0.122  0.222  0.070  0.138  0.095  0.260  0.168 
F dummy labour productivity  0.644  0.362  0.458  0.611  0.411  0.395  0.432  0.323  0.427 
F dummy payroll tax  0.205  0.391  0.359  0.667  0.271  0.289  0.243  0.166  0.274 
F dummy average retention rate  0.370  0.449  0.649  0.611  0.465  0.487  0.392  0.242  0.424 
F dummy marginal retention rate  0.096  0.109  0.107  0.833  0.109  0.092  0.041  0.054  0.100 
F dummy consumer price  0.267  0.312  0.382  0.111  0.597  0.316  0.351  0.220  0.330 
F dummy producer price  0.329  0.355  0.504  0.111  0.403  0.474  0.419  0.206  0.362 
F dummy replacement rate  0.342  0.370  0.336  0.167  0.248  0.362  0.973  0.287  0.367 
F dummy unemployment rate  0.836  0.768  0.672  0.722  0.659  0.763  0.892  0.987  0.807 
R dummy labour productivity  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R dummy payroll tax  0.116  0.297  0.305  0.222  0.171  0.151  0.203  0.139  0.191 
R dummy average retention rate  0.116  0.283  0.328  0.333  0.155  0.151  0.216  0.143  0.194 
R dummy marginal retention ratio  0.000  0.007  0.023  0.167  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.008 
R dummy consumer price  0.096  0.174  0.191  0.667  0.209  0.178  0.041  0.090  0.150 
R dummy producer price  0.096  0.167  0.183  0.667  0.194  0.171  0.054  0.090  0.146 
R dummy replacement ratio  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.000  0.008  0.007  0.014  0.004  0.005 
R dummy unemployment rate  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.023  0.000  0.000  0.013  0.006 
C dummy labour productivity  0.356  0.261  0.107  0.167  0.062  0.309  0.257  0.224  0.227 
C dummy payroll tax  0.267  0.312  0.130  0.000  0.124  0.257  0.257  0.170  0.209 
C dummy average retention ratio  0.021  0.022  0.023  0.000  0.008  0.013  0.014  0.009  0.015 
C dummy marginal retention ratio  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
C dummy consumer price  0.055  0.043  0.046  0.000  0.194  0.013  0.054  0.085  0.069 
C dummy producer price  0.308  0.246  0.069  0.000  0.000  0.355  0.297  0.224  0.212 
C dummy replacement rate  0.007  0.007  0.008  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.014  0.004  0.006 
C dummy unemployment rate  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
                   
Number of observations  146  138  131  18  129  152  74  223   
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Appendix C Regression results 
 
This appendix presents regression results by type of elasticity. Each table contains both LAD 
and OLS estimates. The set of dummy variables is as complete as possible; if a dummy 
included a few positive values only, it is omitted (see also appendix C).  
Labour productivity 
Table C.1 summarizes the regression results. 
Table C.1  Labour productivity elasticity of wages 
            LAD regressions            OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  0.721  0.184  0.000  0.742  0.078  0.000 
The Netherlands dummy  – 0.089  0.073  0.225  – 0.091  0.056  0.104 
Anglo Saxon dummy  0.000  0.039  1.000  0.009  0.032  0.771 
Dummy Nordic countries  0.000  0.054  1.000  0.050  0.050  0.320 
Publication dummy  0.015  0.046  0.749  0.020  0.037  0.599 
Single equation estimator  0.015  0.051  0.772  0.047  0.037  0.212 
Hourly wage dummy  0.010  0.054  0.853  0.103  0.052  0.050 
Bargaining dummy  – 0.010  0.051  0.844  – 0.040  0.043  0.348 
First difference estimation  – 0.018  0.157  0.909  – 0.099  0.095  0.300 
Level estimation  0.010  0.088  0.910  – 0.017  0.057  0.769 
Sector dummy  0.010  0.065  0.878  – 0.016  0.051  0.760 
F dummy payroll tax  0.045  0.081  0.574  0.023  0.070  0.743 
F dummy average retention rate  0.069  0.086  0.426  0.161  0.068  0.020 
F dummy marginal retention rate  0.145  0.181  0.426  0.078  0.100  0.442 
F dummy consumer price  – 0.080  0.069  0.246  0.016  0.082  0.841 
F dummy producer price  0.091  0.092  0.326  0.020  0.090  0.821 
F dummy replacement rate  – 0.035  0.060  0.561  – 0.068  0.044  0.124 
F dummy unemployment rate  0.085  0.125  0.499  – 0.005  0.059  0.929 
R dummy payroll tax  0.048  0.195  0.806  – 0.191  0.125  0.130 
R dummy average retention rate  0.061  0.194  0.753  0.310  0.136  0.024 
R dummy consumer price  – 0.035  0.156  0.823  – 0.183  0.129  0.159 
R dummy producer price  – 0.029  0.238  0.902  0.168  0.140  0.234 
C dummy labour productivity  0.124  0.079  0.119  0.229  0.051  0.000 
C dummy payroll tax  – 0.010  0.070  0.886  – 0.049  0.052  0.349 
C dummy consumer price  0.080  0.104  0.441  0.041  0.063  0.517 
C dummy producer price  0.065  0.099  0.510  0.004  0.064  0.954 
             
2 R   0.312      0.457     
S.E. of regression  0.169      0.344     
median value dependent variable  0.175      0.161     
Mean dependent variable  1.000           
SD dependent var  0.199           
Objective  6.901      3.105     
Observations  146      146      
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The time series dummy has been omitted as all reported elasticities have been estimated using 
time series data. Figure 4.1. already showed that elasticities are rather symmetrically distributed 
around the mean value. The results of table C.1 are in line with this observation: the size of the 
general constant is close to the sample mean and its standard error is small. Country dummies 
do not matter at all, save the dummy for The Netherlands that suggests a small negative 
correction. The coefficients of the restriction dummies (F, R, and C) of income tax variables 
and prices suggest that a more complete wage equation may yield other labour productivity 
elasticities. The coefficient of the C dummy of labour productivity indicates that if the elasticity 
is fixed a priori (in this case, at a value of 1) then this yields a higher elasticity than in case of a 
free estimate. OLS regressions are in line with these findings, although in this case the 
contribution of the hourly wage dummy is more pronounced.   
Payroll taxes 
Figure 4.2 shows that there is a peak in computed elasticities at a value of 1, a value at which  
an increase in payroll taxes is fully shifted to the employees. This a common feature of wage 
equations that take wage costs as the endogenous variable. Therefore we may expect a 
significant impact of the C Dummy of payroll taxes. Table C.2 summarizes outcomes for the 
payroll tax elasticity. The fit is much better than in case of labour productivity, but the most 
striking result is the importance of the first difference dummy. The estimated coefficient 
indicates a substantial difference between short and long term elasticities. The figures in the 
table also confirm that the impact of the C dummy of payroll taxes is considerable and 
significant. Also here, it matters how price ant tax variables enter the wage equation. The C 
dummies of pc and py are substantial and opposite in sign; clearly it matters which of the two is 
used to deflate wages. To sum up: short run elasticities are much smaller in absolute value than 
their long run counterparts. An increase in payroll taxes cannot immediately and completely be 
shifted towards employees. Second, wage equations that do not impose any restrictions on 
payroll taxes (R and C dummies equal 0) yield values of wage elasticities that are smaller in 
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Table C.2  Payroll tax elasticity of wages 
            LAD regressions            OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  – 0.458  0.328  0.166  – 0.400  0.193  0.041 
The Netherlands dummy  – 0.049  0.099  0.622  – 0.068  0.096  0.480 
Anglo Saxon dummy  0.010  0.084  0.910  – 0.034  0.068  0.615 
Dummy Nordic countries  – 0.021  0.078  0.790  – 0.145  0.079  0.070 
Publication dummy  0.090  0.078  0.250  0.201  0.068  0.004 
Time series dummy  – 0.126  0.179  0.483  – 0.101  0.141  0.475 
Single equation estimator  – 0.027  0.104  0.791  0.093  0.061  0.128 
Hourly wage dummy  – 0.120  0.075  0.115  – 0.094  0.061  0.123 
Bargaining dummy  – 0.007  0.061  0.906  – 0.052  0.073  0.480 
Union density  – 0.024  0.094  0.801  0.015  0.082  0.854 
First difference estimation  0.393  0.160  0.016  0.480  0.153  0.002 
Level estimation  – 0.002  0.099  0.982  – 0.098  0.092  0.288 
Sector dummy  0.076  0.084  0.367  0.073  0.065  0.261 
F dummy labour productivity  – 0.001  0.088  0.987  0.032  0.093  0.733 
F dummy average retention rate  – 0.086  0.093  0.354  – 0.137  0.103  0.186 
F dummy marginal retention rate  – 0.064  0.228  0.779  0.045  0.110  0.683 
F dummy consumer price  0.046  0.097  0.641  – 0.076  0.103  0.464 
F dummy producer price  – 0.138  0.102  0.178  0.035  0.112  0.758 
F dummy replacement rate  – 0.018  0.044  0.683  – 0.050  0.043  0.247 
F dummy unemployment rate  – 0.022  0.071  0.755  – 0.087  0.070  0.218 
R dummy payroll tax  – 0.010  0.146  0.945  – 0.075  0.109  0.494 
R dummy average retention rate  – 0.046  0.171  0.789  – 0.036  0.159  0.823 
R dummy consumer price  0.470  0.241  0.054  0.053  0.222  0.812 
R dummy producer price  – 0.212  0.238  0.375  0.122  0.235  0.604 
C dummy labour productivity  0.092  0.101  0.364  0.194  0.119  0.107 
C dummy payroll tax  – 0.293  0.079  0.000  – 0.409  0.067  0.000 
C dummy consumer price  0.330  0.202  0.105  0.316  0.175  0.073 
C dummy producer price  – 0.166  0.127  0.193  – 0.192  0.105  0.070 
             
Adjusted R-squared  0.413      0.536     
S.E. of regression  0.252      0.220     
Median value dependent variable  – 0.720           
Mean dependent variable  – 0.659           
SD dependent var  0.323           
Objective  9.168      5.319     
Observations  128      128     
 
Average income retention rate 
Regression results for the elasticity of the average retention rate are in table C.3.  
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Table C.3  Average income retention rate elasticity of wages ( a − 1 ε ) 
            LAD regressions            OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  – 0.043  0.232  0.854  0.013  0.155  0.931 
The Netherlands dummy  0.074  0.121  0.546  0.076  0.068  0.268 
Anglo Saxon dummy  – 0.061  0.148  0.679  – 0.039  0.081  0.631 
Dummy Nordic countries  – 0.120  0.152  0.432  0.005  0.075  0.943 
Publication dummy  – 0.259  0.123  0.037  – 0.215  0.066  0.002 
Time series dummy  – 0.282  0.221  0.205  – 0.342  0.133  0.012 
Single equation estimator  – 0.180  0.099  0.072  – 0.198  0.065  0.003 
Hourly wage dummy  0.163  0.126  0.199  0.090  0.088  0.310 
Bargaining dummy  0.119  0.152  0.435  0.137  0.085  0.110 
First difference estimation  – 0.222  0.163  0.175  – 0.208  0.110  0.061 
Level estimation  0.170  0.118  0.153  0.144  0.077  0.065 
Sector dummy  0.035  0.086  0.686  – 0.087  0.066  0.190 
F dummy labour productivity  0.084  0.098  0.395  0.017  0.060  0.771 
F dummy payroll tax  – 0.008  0.117  0.947  0.007  0.086  0.935 
F dummy marginal retention rate  – 0.101  0.210  0.630  – 0.035  0.120  0.773 
F dummy consumer price  0.113  0.176  0.522  0.105  0.082  0.203 
F dummy producer price  – 0.121  0.096  0.209  – 0.130  0.063  0.042 
F dummy replacement rate  – 0.018  0.120  0.881  0.034  0.065  0.608 
F dummy unemployment rate  0.124  0.146  0.398  0.096  0.068  0.156 
R dummy payroll tax  – 0.024  0.172  0.887  – 0.101  0.098  0.302 
R dummy average retention rate  – 0.099  0.161  0.542  0.011  0.084  0.899 
R dummy consumer price  0.239  0.420  0.571  0.182  0.184  0.327 
R dummy producer price  – 0.313  0.450  0.489  – 0.248  0.199  0.216 
C dummy labour productivity  – 0.040  0.177  0.821  – 0.135  0.107  0.212 
C dummy payroll tax  – 0.035  0.158  0.828  0.123  0.109  0.261 
             
2 R   0.163      0.280     
S.E. of regression  0.249      0.235     
Median value dependent variable  – 0.368           
Mean dependent variable  – 0.390           
SD dependent var  0.277           
Objective  10.690      5.847     
Observations  131      131     
 
It is not very surprising that here, like in the case of payroll taxes short term elasticities 
significantly differ from their long term values. In this case however, short run elasticities are 
larger in absolute value than their long run equivalents. The coefficient of the level estimation 
dummy shows that wage equations that have been estimated in levels (i.e. without any 
dynamics) yield smaller (absolute) values of the income tax elasticity. The coefficient of the C 
dummy of the consumer price indicates that tax elasticities obtained from real wage equations 
are larger in absolute value. Recall that the C dummy equals 1 if the elasticity is fixed; in case 
of the consumer price this value always equals 1.  
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Marginal income retention rate 
Here our sample is very limited: 18 observations only. In this rather small sample the use of 
dummy variables is limited as they probably are highly correlated. Therefore in Table C.4 we 
present two reduced regressions using a general constant and 3 country dummies only. The 
Anglo Saxon dummy absorbs the large residual resulting from Lockwood and Manning (1993), 
who report a value of 0.65. Similarly, the country dummy for The Netherlands indicates the 
impact of Graafland et al (1999) and Peeters and den Reijer (2001, 2002).  
Table C.4  Marginal Income tax elasticity of pay ( m − 1 ε ) 
           Least Absolute deviations          OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  0.011  0.188  0.954  0.149  0.111  0.201 
The Netherlands dummy  0.261  0.410  0.535  0.122  0.111  0.290 
Anglo Saxon Dummy  0.189  0.267  0.490  0.128  0.158  0.430 
Dummy Nordic countries  0.235  0.278  0.412  0.123  0.152  0.430 
             
2 R   − 0.008      − 0.134     
Mean value  0.226      0.226     
Standard error  0.245      0.245     
Median value  0.200      0.200     
Objective  1.569      0.953     
Observations  18      18     
 
The results indicate the sample is to small to draw solid general conclusions, except one: the 
sample mean (or median) is possibly the best guess of the correct value (see also section 6).  
Output prices 
Table C.5 summarizes outcomes for the output price elasticity. The equation fits rather well, 
both for LAD and OLS estimates. From the table four conclusions emerge. First, wage 
equations estimated with times series data yield substantially lower output price elasticities than 
those regressed on panel or cross section data. Second, elasticities based on sector analysis are 
lower than their macro equivalents.  Third, the results also suggest that level estimation (that 
does not account for any dynamics) produces lower elasticities. The most important result 
however is the dependence of the output price elasticity on the way the consumer price enters 
the wage equation. All restriction dummies (F, R, and C) related to pc have a considerable 
impact on the size of the output price elasticity. 
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Table C.5  Output price elasticity of wages  
            LAD regressions            OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  1.467  0.340  0.000  1.249  0.266  0.000 
The Netherlands dummy  – 0.057  0.064  0.372  – 0.034  0.058  0.554 
Anglo Saxon dummy  0.000  0.043  1.000  0.039  0.051  0.445 
Dummy Nordic countries  0.099  0.066  0.137  0.040  0.057  0.488 
Publication dummy  – 0.070  0.045  0.124  – 0.081  0.038  0.033 
Time series dummy  – 0.562  0.418  0.181  – 0.276  0.269  0.306 
Single equation estimator  – 0.072  0.083  0.388  – 0.109  0.044  0.014 
Hourly wage dummy  0.038  0.048  0.427  0.068  0.041  0.098 
Bargaining dummy  – 0.022  0.095  0.821  0.011  0.050  0.832 
Dummy union density  – 0.135  0.197  0.493  – 0.236  0.107  0.030 
First difference estimation  – 0.059  0.101  0.557  – 0.177  0.093  0.060 
Level estimation  – 0.065  0.135  0.632  – 0.080  0.081  0.326 
Sector dummy  – 0.120  0.078  0.128  – 0.159  0.048  0.001 
Time dummy 1990 - 2008  – 0.017  0.095  0.854  0.029  0.048  0.554 
F dummy labour productivity  0.151  0.078  0.055  0.099  0.052  0.062 
F dummy payroll tax  – 0.151  0.092  0.104  – 0.152  0.056  0.007 
F dummy average retention rate  0.137  0.086  0.112  0.116  0.057  0.043 
F dummy marginal retention rate  – 0.054  0.106  0.613  – 0.129  0.083  0.121 
F dummy consumer price  – 0.427  0.076  0.000  – 0.332  0.064  0.000 
F dummy replacement rate  0.032  0.051  0.526  0.057  0.042  0.176 
F dummy unemployment rate  – 0.171  0.081  0.036  – 0.218  0.053  0.000 
R dummy payroll tax  – 0.145  0.166  0.384  – 0.179  0.166  0.281 
R dummy average retention rate  0.172  0.167  0.303  0.124  0.164  0.449 
R dummy consumer price  – 0.585  0.135  0.000  – 0.319  0.189  0.093 
R dummy producer price  0.269  0.142  0.061  0.097  0.188  0.606 
C dummy labour productivity  0.189  0.071  0.009  0.150  0.057  0.009 
C dummy payroll tax  – 0.039  0.060  0.515  – 0.035  0.040  0.381 
C dummy producer price  0.188  0.058  0.002  0.209  0.044  0.000 
             
2 R   0.607      0.763     
S.E. of regression  0.199      0.177     
Median value dependent variable  0.744           
Mean value dependent vriable  0.657           
Objective  8.292      4.275     
Observations  152      152     
 
Consumer price 
Table C.6 summarizes outcomes for the consumer price elasticity. Inclusion of dummies does 
not explain that much variation in elasticities. In all regressions the general constant is highly 
significant but this does not explain much, however. 
The use of simultaneous estimation techniques (e.g. to take endogeneity of prices into 
account) produces lower consumer price elasticities of pay. Table C.10 shows that the inclusion  
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of the output price has a substantial and significant impact on reported estimates. This finding is 
consistent with earlier conclusions. We may conclude that if one of the prices py or pc is omitted 
from the wage equation, the elasticity of the remaining price is biased upwards.  
The C Dummy corresponding to the output price is zero everywhere and has been omitted. 
Like in case of the output price elasticity, R dummies of pc and py and of 1+ s and 1– ta are 
highly correlated.  
 
Table C.6  Consumer price elasticity of wages  
            LAD regressions            OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  0.631  0.157  0.000  0.611  0.118  0.000 
The Netherlands dummy  0.004  0.086  0.963  – 0.068  0.069  0.329 
Anglo Saxon dummy  0.000  0.086  1.000  – 0.136  0.075  0.071 
Dummy Nordic countries  – 0.060  0.077  0.438  – 0.048  0.073  0.516 
Publication dummy  0.086  0.080  0.286  0.098  0.063  0.120 
Time series dummy  – 0.007  0.115  0.950  – 0.012  0.093  0.895 
Single equation estimator  0.161  0.085  0.062  0.216  0.056  0.000 
Hourly wage dummy  0.027  0.100  0.791  0.050  0.072  0.491 
Bargaining dummy  0.122  0.109  0.267  0.066  0.058  0.261 
First difference estimation  0.041  0.177  0.817  0.012  0.087  0.891 
Level estimation  – 0.116  0.158  0.465  – 0.021  0.099  0.830 
Sector dummy  0.120  0.099  0.230  0.078  0.072  0.284 
F dummy labour productivity  – 0.060  0.119  0.615  – 0.021  0.062  0.732 
F dummy payroll tax  0.084  0.169  0.619  0.106  0.093  0.253 
F dummy average retention rate  – 0.004  0.146  0.978  – 0.061  0.076  0.425 
F dummy marginal retention rate  0.027  0.160  0.864  0.101  0.108  0.352 
F dummy producer price  – 0.307  0.151  0.044  – 0.195  0.107  0.072 
F dummy replacement rate  – 0.153  0.123  0.214  – 0.149  0.076  0.053 
F dummy unemployment rate  0.153  0.063  0.017  0.112  0.049  0.024 
R dummy payroll tax  – 0.257  0.191  0.182  – 0.130  0.133  0.332 
R dummy average retention rate  0.269  0.146  0.068  0.137  0.118  0.246 
R dummy consumer price  – 0.058  0.184  0.752  – 0.185  0.127  0.148 
R dummy producer price  – 0.267  0.217  0.221  – 0.081  0.161  0.615 
C dummy labour productivity  – 0.028  0.165  0.864  – 0.006  0.094  0.953 
C dummy payroll tax  0.060  0.173  0.731  0.011  0.087  0.899 
C dummy consumer price  0.129  0.086  0.137  0.178  0.072  0.015 
             
2 R   0.304      0.442     
S.E. of regression  0.220      0.204     
Median value dependent variable  0.790      0.790     
Mean dependent variable  0.725      0.725     
SD dependent variable  0.273      0.273     
Objective  8.162      5.454     
Observations  129      129     
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Replacement ratio 
In this section we add the level of unemployment to our regression to test the hypothesis that 
the replacement ratio elasticity of pay is smaller when unemployment is low. With low 
unemployment, spells of inactivity are relatively short and the unemployment benefit level will 
exert only a small impact on the alternative wage (Graafland et al (2001)).  
Table C.7  Replacement rate elasticity of wages  
            LAD regressions            OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  – 0.354  0.464  0.449  – 0.770  0.349  0.033 
The Netherlands dummy  0.104  0.131  0.432  0.170  0.112  0.138 
Anglo Saxon dummy  – 0.037  0.163  0.822  – 0.136  0.104  0.195 
Dummy Nordic countries  – 0.059  0.166  0.726  – 0.095  0.132  0.474 
Publication dummy  0.181  0.167  0.282  0.189  0.100  0.064 
Time series dummy  0.486  0.275  0.084  0.662  0.227  0.006 
Single equation estimator  0.069  0.200  0.731  0.207  0.098  0.040 
Hourly wage dummy  – 0.186  0.206  0.373  – 0.058  0.106  0.587 
Bargaining dummy  0.081  0.141  0.567  0.076  0.108  0.484 
Level estimation  – 0.069  0.162  0.673  – 0.172  0.126  0.178 
Sector dummy  0.147  0.193  0.448  0.121  0.091  0.188 
F dummy labour productivity  0.043  0.159  0.786  – 0.051  0.117  0.666 
F dummy payroll tax  – 0.330  0.155  0.038  – 0.192  0.108  0.083 
F dummy average retention rate  0.107  0.163  0.516  0.148  0.119  0.217 
F dummy marginal retention rate  0.036  0.225  0.875  0.011  0.174  0.948 
F dummy consumer price  0.050  0.219  0.820  0.039  0.119  0.748 
F dummy producer price  – 0.110  0.183  0.551  – 0.113  0.134  0.403 
F dummy unemployment rate  – 0.071  0.210  0.737  0.054  0.107  0.615 
R dummy payroll tax  – 0.688  0.317  0.035  – 0.699  0.211  0.002 
R dummy average retention rate  0.539  0.392  0.176  0.616  0.220  0.007 
R dummy consumer price  – 0.450  0.418  0.288  – 0.667  0.267  0.016 
R dummy producer price  0.187  0.336  0.581  0.347  0.211  0.107 
C dummy labour productivity  0.192  0.196  0.331  – 0.025  0.161  0.876 
C dummy payroll tax  – 0.140  0.179  0.439  – 0.089  0.120  0.463 
C dummy consumer price  0.081  0.352  0.818  0.095  0.142  0.509 
C dummy producer price  0.057  0.150  0.705  0.115  0.119  0.338 
Volume unemployment rate  0.007  0.019  0.695  0.026  0.014  0.070 
             
2 R   0.119      0.371     
S.E. of regression  0.250      0.218     
Median value dependent variable  0.322      0.322     
Mean dependent variable  0.349      0.349     
SD dependent var  0.274      0.274     
Objective  4.303      2.129     
Observations  74      74     
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Table C.7 summarizes outcomes. The average level of the unemployment rate (expressed as % 
of the working population) has a small positive impact on the estimated elasticity. The sample 
mean of the time series dummy is close to 1 so its coefficient compensates the negative general 
constant. The sector dummy has an important positive impact on estimated elasticities: its value 
is 0.24 higher than the one based on aggregate data. This is possibly due to the fallback 
position: in sectoral regressions this not only includes unemployment or welfare benefits, but 
also an opportunity wage that can be earned in other sectors. Employers in a specific sector 
have to offer their employees higher wages if wages in the rest of the economy increase to 
prevent job quitting. So the elasticity may be higher than can be expected on basis of a pure 
macro benefit based replacement ratio.  
The R dummies of the tax variables 1+s and 1– ta are highly correlated; but the net impact of 
both R dummies on the replacement rate elasticity is small. 
Unemployment rate 
In this case there are three questions. First, does the wage equation have a macro economic 
counterpart that links real macro wages to aggregate unemployment rates? Second, can we 
attribute cross study variations in reported unemployment elasticities of pay to variations in our 
moderator variables or does the elasticity simply obey an ‘empirical law of economics’ 
(Card(1995))? Finally, we also want to investigate whether the level of the replacement ratio 
has an impact on reported values of the unemployment elasticity of pay. If the replacement ratio 
increases we expect the impact of unemployment on wages to decline. Job seekers are less 
likely to accept a lower wage offer when the replacement ratio is high.   
To answer the third question, we have to link each unemployment elasticity of pay to an 
average level of the replacement ratio in the same publication. For a number of observations 
however, no levels of the replacement ratio were available, notably in case of  (former) 
transition economies (Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria). Also, a small number of 
unemployment elasticities corresponds to groups of OECD countries. Indeed, it is possible to 
aggregate replacement ratios over OECD countries using country data on average wages, 
income retention rates, average unemployment ratio’s and total employment. This is a rather 
time consuming process however, while it adds no more than 4 observations to the total of over  
200.  
Therefore we proceed in two steps. First, we run regressions using only unemployment 
elasticities that can be linked to an average replacement ratio (a sample of 199 observations). If 
the volume of the replacement ratio does not contribute much to the explanation of the variation 
in our sample, we will omit it from the regressions and use the full sample of 223 data points.   
The results of the first step indicate that the coefficient of the level of the replacement ratio 
doesn’t have the expected sign: a higher replacement ratio increases the absolute value of the  
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unemployment elasticity of pay. This result is independent of the estimation technique;  if we 
use OLS the estimated coefficient is even significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Therefore we proceed with the second step and omit the level of the average replacement rate 
from the equation. Table C.8 reports the result for the full sample of 223 observations.  
 
Table C.8  Unemployment rate elasticity of wages  
            LAD regressions            OLS regressions 
  coefficient  std.  error  p - value  coefficient  std. error  p - value 
             
Constant  – 0.053  0.036  0.145  – 0.091  0.032  0.005 
The Netherlands dummy  – 0.001  0.017  0.952  – 0.005  0.023  0.839 
Anglo Saxon dummy  0.037  0.018  0.044  0.038  0.018  0.036 
Dummy Nordic countries  – 0.011  0.023  0.624  – 0.001  0.019  0.952 
Publication dummy  – 0.008  0.020  0.703  – 0.003  0.019  0.873 
Time series dummy  – 0.032  0.031  0.308  – 0.009  0.029  0.751 
Single equation estimator  0.003  0.016  0.839  0.021  0.016  0.198 
Hourly wage dummy  0.008  0.025  0.744  – 0.018  0.019  0.344 
Bargaining dummy  0.005  0.017  0.775  – 0.019  0.018  0.286 
Level estimation  – 0.002  0.036  0.949  – 0.005  0.020  0.799 
Sector dummy  0.013  0.020  0.521  0.022  0.018  0.242 
Time dummy 1990 - 2008  0.013  0.017  0.426  0.017  0.019  0.367 
F dummy labour productivity  0.017  0.021  0.430  0.019  0.024  0.425 
F dummy payroll tax  – 0.022  0.024  0.366  – 0.001  0.022  0.949 
F dummy average retention rate  – 0.009  0.033  0.783  – 0.013  0.024  0.591 
F dummy marginal retention rate  – 0.068  0.056  0.226  – 0.071  0.046  0.120 
F dummy consumer price  0.030  0.019  0.116  0.041  0.017  0.015 
F dummy producer price  0.019  0.021  0.366  0.028  0.019  0.150 
F dummy replacement rate  – 0.006  0.017  0.710  – 0.014  0.016  0.399 
R dummy payroll tax  0.004  0.038  0.921  0.035  0.038  0.357 
R dummy average retention rate  – 0.023  0.034  0.504  – 0.033  0.035  0.344 
R dummy consumer price  – 0.002  0.055  0.969  0.030  0.036  0.400 
R dummy producer price  – 0.038  0.083  0.648  – 0.064  0.040  0.107 
C dummy labour productivity  – 0.001  0.030  0.963  – 0.019  0.036  0.600 
C dummy payroll tax  – 0.044  0.022  0.040  – 0.044  0.024  0.066 
C dummy consumer price  0.000  0.028  0.988  – 0.021  0.030  0.479 
C dummy producer price  0.026  0.024  0.278  0.042  0.027  0.127 
             
2 R   0.021      0.081    0.081 
S.E. of regression  0.094      0.089    0.089 
Median value dependent variable  – 0.064      – 0.064    1.564 
Mean dependent variable  – 0.089      – 0.089     
SD dependent var  0.093      0.093     
Objective  6.087      1.564     
Observations  223      223     
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It is remarkable that the fit is very poor. Of all possible non-FRC dummies only the time series 
and the Anglo Saxon dummy provide some explanatory power. OLS regressions are in line with 
the LAD estimates, but are somewhat more pronounced.  
From table C.15 it follows that the inclusion of labour productivity and consumer price 
matters.  In case of the consumer price, it makes a difference whether it has been used as 
deflator for wages (C dummy). Restrictions (e.g. through a price wedge variable) have hardly 
any impact on estimated elasticities.  
As to our first question on the ‘macro wage curve’ the results provide some support. If we 
run an additional regression using just the Anglo Saxon, time series and the FRC dummies for 
the consumer price, the restrictions are not rejected by the data. The value of the objective 
function increases to 6.6, resulting in a test statistic of 29.5 (the critical value of χ
2 (21) is 32.7). 
This implies that if all our data points had been obtained from simple regressions of the real 
wage on the unemployment ratio, the results would not systematically differ from what we 
observe now.  
This conclusion is in line with the ‘empirical law of economics’ suggestion. From the tables 
it follows that the estimated relation has hardly any explanatory power. There are some 
differences across country groups, but the spread can hardly be explained. In the next chapter 
we will see that the ‘best’ value of the macro elasticity is very close to the results found in the 
wage curve literature.   
Finally, our results do not support the hypothesis on the expected impact of the level of the 
replacement ratio on the unemployment elasticity of pay. Maybe the impact depends on the 
generosity of the welfare state. Regressions including the replacement ratio level for The 
Netherlands only did not yield the expected results either.  
System LS regressions 
Tables C.16 to C.18 display the elasticities obtained from the LS systems regressions for 
producer and income taxes and prices. In all tables we see that short and long term elasticities 
generally differ, like in LAD regressions. The macro and average price elasticities are not the 
same, and again this is consistent with earlier results. Benchmark values, however, may 
substantially differ from those reported in Table 6.5-Table 6.7.  
Table C.16  Elasticities of pay, The Netherlands, system LS regressions 
Observations: 53          Long term elasticity         Short term elasticity            Sample mean 
  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  System  Full 
             
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.870  – 0.870  – 0.568  – 0.568  – 0.616  – 0.670 
Average income tax (1– ta)  – 0.219  – 0.219  – 0.497  – 0.497  – 0.420  – 0.391 
Consumer price (pc)  0.320  0.320  0.503  0.503  0.625  0.725 
Producer price (py)  0.620  0.620  0.424  0.424  0.327  0.657 
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In case of the Netherlands, payroll tax elasticities are higher in absolute value compared to 
those in table 6.4. Income tax elasticities are smaller, although sample means do not differ that 
much. The reduction in price elasticities is more than 40%; this may partly be due to the sample 
mean of the output price elasticity. About 65% of the observations refer to sectoral output prices 
rather than 40% in the full sample; and the elasticity of pay of sectoral output prices is lower 
than the macro elasticity (see also Tables 6.5 to 6.7).  
For Anglo Saxon countries the elasticities of the average income tax retention ratio are 
virtually   the same as in Table 6.6. Long term payroll tax elasticities are smaller, but the short 
run values are higher. Like for the Netherlands, consumer and producer price elasticities are 
much smaller. In the long run, values of the producer price elasticity are higher than in short 
run, but the difference is larger than in case of LAD estimates. For the consumer price elasticity 
the short run elasticity is highest; this contradicts the results of Table 6.6. 
Table C.17  Elasticities of pay, Anglo Saxon countries, system LS regressions 
Observations: 53             Long term elasticity             Short term elasticity           Sample mean 
  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  System  Full 
             
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.681  – 0.681  – 0.379  – 0.379  – 0.616  – 0.670 
Average income tax (1– ta)  – 0.309  – 0.309  – 0.587  – 0.587  – 0.420  – 0.391 
Consumer price (pc)  0.485  0.485  0.668  0.668  0.625  0.725 
Producer price (py)  0.477  0.477  0.281  0.281  0.327  0.657 
 
Table C.18  Elasticities of pay, Other countries, system LS regressions 
Observations: 53             Long term elasticity             Short term elasticity           Sample mean 
  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  system  full 
             
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.681  – 0.681  – 0.379  – 0.379  – 0.616  – 0.670 
Average income tax (1– ta)  – 0.309  – 0.309  – 0.587  – 0.587  – 0.420  – 0.391 
Consumer price (pc)  0.485  0.485  0.668  0.668  0.625  0.725 
Producer price (py)  0.477  0.477  0.281  0.281  0.327  0.657 
 
Results for other countries are exactly the same as in case of Anglo Saxon countries. The only 
difference between both country groups in tables 6.6 and 6.7 concerns the unemployment 
elasticity of pay. We will discuss this elasticity now. Table 6.11 summarizes the results of 
regressions on the elasticities of pc, py using a common sample of 48 observations.  
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Table  C.19  Elasticities of pay, LS regressions (pc, py, ur)  
Observations: 48         Long term elasticity         Short term elasticity            Sample mean 
  Macro  Average  Macro  Average  System  Full 
The Netherlands             
Consumer price (pc)  0.618  0.684  0.618  0.684  0.662  0.725 
Producer price (py)  0.186  0.027  0.186  0.027  0.336  0.657 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.062  – 0.056  – 0.062  – 0.056  – 0.106  – 0.094 
             
Anglo Saxon countries             
Consumer price (pc)  0.274  0.340  0.274  0.340  0.662  0.725 
Producer price (py)  0.654  0.496  0.654  0.496  0.336  0.657 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.004  0.003  – 0.004  0.003  – 0.106  – 0.094 
             
Other countries             
Consumer price (pc)  0.638  0.705  0.638  0.705  0.662  0.725 
Producer price (py)  0.306  0.147  0.306  0.147  0.336  0.657 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.071  – 0.064  – 0.071  – 0.064  – 0.106  – 0.094 
 
Again, the sample mean of the producer price elasticity is much smaller than in the full sample. 
Values for price elasticities are not only different from those in the LAD regressions, but also 
from LS regressions in tables C.16 to C.18. In addition, the size of the estimated coefficient of 
the sector dummy for the Netherlands in the equation of py is unrealistic: it implies a negative 
sectoral price elasticity of pay. In case of the Anglo Saxon countries, the country dummies for 
pc and py are substantial (about 0.4) and opposite in sign. As a result, producer price elasticities 
are much higher than those of other countries while for the consumer price elasticities the 
opposite holds. Unemployment elasticities of pay are almost the same for other countries, 
compared to the LAD results in table 6.7. In case of the Netherlands elasticities of ur are 
somewhat smaller while values for Anglo Saxon countries are almost zero.  
What is the conclusion? Clearly considerable differences in sample size and composition 
hamper a meaningful comparison between LAD and LS system regressions. Also, the relative 
sensitivity to outliers of LS as compared to LAD results in relatively high values of the 
coefficients of specific dummies. Nevertheless, tax elasticities are rather similar and 
corresponding distinction between short and long term values is confirmed. Price elasticities are 
not easily compared and their values are sometimes unrealistic. Unemployment elasticities of 
pay obtained from both methods reasonably match. In case of Anglo Saxon countries, the size 
of the country dummy reduces the elasticity towards zero.  
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